LAXMI Vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner has challenged an order of externment passed on 14th of April 1987 by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, West District, New Delhi under sections 47/50 of the Delhi Police Act directing that she remove herself outside the limits of the Union Territory of Delhi for a period of two years. This order followed a notice under sections 47/50 of the Delhi Police Act dated 8th of January 1986. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Lt. Governor which failed.

(2.) The validity of the order is being challenged on various grounds. The petitioner states that she had filed a complaint against some police officers and that it is in that background that she has been proceeded against under sections 47/50 of the Delhi Police Act. This, however, is denied by the respondent in the counter affidavit. It will be of some advantage to refer particularly to the contents of the notice under section 47 served upon the petitioner. After reproducing the expression used in section 47(a)(b)(c)(i) 7 cases mostly under the Excise Act have been detailed and she is told that all this makes out a case against her under section 47(a)(b)(c)(i) of Delhi Police Act. I may also take notice of the order passed wherein again after considering . her written statement and the evidence of the defence witnesses the Deputy Commissioner of Police goes on to state that he is satisfied that the petitioner is engaged in the commission of offences as she was again arrested during the course of proceedings in three more cases. The crux of the order states that he is satisfied about the petitioner being engaged in the commission of offences and that he is further satisfied that the witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against her for fear on their part as regards the safety of their person or property. After saying so the impugned externment order is passed. The order would show that the basis made for the externment is that she is involved in the commission of offences and the witnesses are not forthcoming against her to tender evidence in public for fear of their safety. It is true that in the beginning of the order the Deputy Commissioner has stated that on information that her activities are desperate and her movements are causing harm and danger to the persons and property, proceeding under section 47 of the Delhi Police Act were initiated. But in the coucluding part of his order he does not hold the view that she is possessed of the character as envisaged by section 47(a)(b)(c). This is perhaps due to the fact that the Deputy Commissioner concerned found no material to hold that the movements or acts of the petitioner are causing or calculated to cause alarm .danger or harm to any person or property or that she is so desperate and dangerous as to render her being at large in Delhi or in any part thereof hazardous to the community and he further found that the offences which are made basis for these proceedings do not fall within the category of The offences mentioned in section 47(b). So the very first basis for passing an order of externment is lacking in the order itself. Moreover, the notice as also the order states in general terms that the witnesses are not forth-coming to tender evidence against her for fear of their own safety. Mr. Lao states that the requirement of section 50 is that she has to be informed in general terms the nature of material allegations against her and afforded an opportunity to explain the same. He submits that if the witnesses are nominated the very purpose would become casualty in the process.

(3.) It is true that section 50 requires of the Commissioner of Police to give notice informing her of the general nature of the material allegations but it also states that she has to be afforded an opportunity of tendering an explanation. Since she is required to tender an explanation the expression "general nature of material allegations" would not mean a vague allegation but would mean that she has to be informed of the allegations which she is required to meet and she must know regarding what she to tender an explanation. The expression "general nature" used in the provision as such cannot be given such a limited meaning as to destroy the right of the person to tender explanation which can only be done if he or she knows what he or she is required to explain.