BHARAT STEEL TUBES LIMITED Vs. RAM PIARI SETHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This review application has been moved against the judgment dated 1/6/1984, of M.L. Jain, J. (as His Lordship then was) by which he had dismissed the civil revision filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short 'the Act') against the eviction order passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Shri Brajesh Kumar, on 13/10/1980, on the ground of bonafide requirement for residence covered by Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act.

(2.) . I have heard the arguments in detail in order to first decide whether the review petition should be admitted for hearing or not. M.L. Jain, J. had retired in July 1984 and this review petition was moved after His Lordship's retirement. Many grounds were mentioned in the review petition but at the stage of arguments Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate, who appeared for the petitioner, confined his arguments only on one point i.e. that the court has committed an error apparent on the face of the record in not giving any categorical decision on the legal question arising in the case as to whether the respondent-landlady, who had only right to have the maintenance from the income of the house in question, could be deemed to be an owner contemplated in Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. I may mention that a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that the High Court had no power of review in respect of the orders made under Section 25-B(8) of the Act However, that preliminory objection was overruled by J.D. Jain, J. (as His Lordship then was) vide order dated 3/1/1986. It was held by His Lordship that it was established law that where ordinary courts are seized of a dispute in respect of legal right or liability under a special enactment, they must be regarded as having power to adjudicate such disputes according to the ordinary rules of practice and procedure which would include the power to review their judgment and orders, even in the absence of an express provision in the concerned Act conferring the power of review. It was further held that such a power will inhere in High Court when it is seized of a matter under a special enactment, it being a court of record and plenary jurisdiction, but such power ought to be exercised on the grounds analogous to the grounds mentioned in order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The short question which arises for decision is whether there has occurred any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record while passing the judgment dated June 1,1984.

(3.) . One of the pie-requisites for succeeding on the ground of bonafide requirement for residence as mentioned in Clause (e) is that the landlord seeking eviction on such a ground of bonafide requirement for residence must allege and prove that he or she is the owner of the demised premises. The facts of this case show that the respondent landlady had acquired this plot vide sale deed, a copy of which is Ex. AW/1 dated 14/5/1957 and had <PG>375</PG> raised a construction over the said plot but later on some disputes allegedly arising between her and her sons, an arbitrator was appointed who gave the award, copy of which is EX. AE/I dated 25/5/1968, which was made a rule of the Court By virtue of this award the respondent-landlady was given the right to have possession of the property till her death and she was debarred from alienating the property in any manner to anyone. The award also provided that out of the rental income the respondent-landlady was to get Rs. 750.00 per mensem on account of her maintenance. Two Receivers were also named for the same in accordance with the terms of the award. During pendency of the eviction case, a declaratory decree was also obtained showing that the respondent is the co-owner of the property although it was also made clear in that declaratory decree that respondent-landlady had only a life interest in the property. The declaratory decree only tried to interpret the previous award. It is quite clear that unless and until it was to be held that the respondent-landlady is the owner of the property in question she could not succeed on the ground of bonafide requirement for residence. It is to be mentioned here that the existence of relationship of landlord tenant between respondent and the petitioner was not disputed in the pleadings. While dealing with this subject of ownership at page 11 of the judgment it was mentioned that the very first question that arises is whether Mrs. Sethi is the owner of the premises. The reference is made to certain judgments which define the word 'owner' as the person having absolute dominion over a thing. Then reference is made to three judgments reported as T.C. Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujral, , Inder Singh v. Dr. Nanak Chand, 1969 RCR 79 and Kanwal Kishore Chopra v. O.P. Diwedi, 1977 (2) RCJ 320, which lay down the law that it is not necessary that the landlord should be an absolute owner in order to be covered by the word 'owner' appearing in Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Those cases were of the landlords holding leasehold rights in the properties. Then reference is made to M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal, AIR 1981 SC 1113 (para 14), and it was observed as follows :