R GUPTA Vs. NIRMAL NANDA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal has been filed under Section 39(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act against the judgment dated April 23, 1987, of Mr. M.A. Khan, Rent Control Tribunal, by which he dismissed the appeal brought against the order dated April 4,1987, of Mr.Ajit Bharihoke, Additional Rent Controller, dismissing the application of the appellant seeking amendment of the written statement in order to take a new plea that initially the appellant alone was not the tenant in the premises in question but a partnership firm under the name and style of M/s. D P. Gupta & Company was the tenant.

(2.) Smt. Nirmal Nanda-respondent No. 1 in this appeal is the landlady of the premises in question and she brought the eviction petition on August 14, 1984, pleading that the premises in question part of house No. C-11, N.D.S.E. Part II, New Delhi, had been let out to the appellant with effect from 1st July 1963 at the rental of Rs. 450.00 per mensem for residential purposes and he has without the written consent of the landlady sublet, assigned and parted with possession of the said premises in favour of M/s. DP Gupta & Company (P) Limited in July 1984 and the tenant himself has built/acquired vacant possession of the premises at C-729 . New Friends Colony, and that the respondent-tenant has caused substantial damage to the premises. These grounds are covered by clauses (b), (h) & (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appellant filed the written statement in which he made an admission that he had initiallly taken the premises in question on rent but he took the plea that he was a partner of M/s. D.P. Gupta & Company which comprised of three partners, namely, the appellant. Raj Gupta and D.P. Gupta in 1976 and M/s. D.P. Gupta & Co. Private Limited was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and the said Company took over all the assets and liabilities of the said partnership firm and on the request of the appellant the landlady accepted the said Company as a tenant in the premises in dispute in place of the appellant. So, according to the case set up in the written statement, the appellant ceased to be the tenant as he surrendered the tenancy rights and the landlady created the tenancy in favour of the Private Limited Company. It was admitted fact that the premises had been let out for residential purposes and that the appellant bad constructed his own new residential house where he has shifted. In replication the landlady controverted the avernments of the appellant that any tenancy had been created in favour of the said Company.

(3.) During the pendency of the case, on application being moved by the appellant, the said Company was also added as respondent No. 2 in the eviction case. The landlady completed her evidence on August 12, 1986. The appellant appeared as RW1 and completed his evidence. The Company examined two witnesses and also completed the evidence. The case was fixed for final arguments and then the appellant moved the application seeking amendment of the written statement in order to take the plea that in fact, he had not taken the premises in question as a tenant in individual capacity and initially the said partnership firm comprising of three partners including the appellant had taken the premises on rent. It was pleaded by the appellant that he made a wrong and erroneous admission of fact and he was under the wrong impression throughout that he alone is the tenant in the premises in question and while he was searching some old record, he came across two letters, one copy of the letter dated 1st July 1963 written by him on behalf of M/s. D.P. Gupta & Company mentioning about taking of the premises on rent and the other is the reply given by the landlady of the same date accepting the terms and conditions of the tenancy given in the aforesaid letter. So, it was sought to be pleaded that in fact, the premises were taken on rent by the partnership firm and by mistake for all these years the appellant bad been considering himself to be the sole tenant in the premises in question and so he prayed that the appellant may be allowed to amend the written statement to take the correct plea in the written statement. This amendment is not sought without some purpose. It is obvious that if on merits a finding is given that the appellant never surrendered the tenancy and the landlady never accepted the Company as tenant, the appellant has no case and the eviction order was bound to follow but if the appellant now is allowed to amend the written statement the effect would be that not only the appellant alone but his other two erstwhile partners would be also deemed to be tenants in the premises in question and thus the ground covered by clause (h) that the tenant has acquired another residence may not be available to the landlady and it may also result in sufficient delay in the disposal of the case because then the whole case will have to be tried again on new pleas which may be raised not only by the appellant by seeking amendment of the written statement but by his other two partners by filing a new written statement after the partnership firm is joined as a respondent. As far as the law is concerned, it is almost settled that no party can be allowed to withdraw admission made in the pleadings without any sufficient reasons. (See Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay, AIR 1983 SC 462). In the present case this particular appellant has not only made an admission in the pleadings that he alone took the premises on rent initially but he reiterated his plea when he appeared in the witness box and same plea remained intact while cross-examining Smt. Nirmal Nanda and it also came out in the evidence that although the rent was being paid to the landlady from the partnership account yet it was the appellant alone who was being debited with that rent in his account in the partnership meaning thereby that at no point of time the partnership claimed any tenancy rights in the premises and it has been the uniform case of the appellant and his partnership firm that appellant is tenant in his individual capacity in the premises in dispute. It is also significant to mention that in 1984 a civil suit was brought seeking injunction restraining the appellant from subletting or parting with possession of the premises in question to anyone when appellant was in the process of shifting to his new house. An injunction was also granted ex-parte but the appellant took the plea when he appeared in that suit that in fact, he had given the premises in question to his own brother as a licensee and that possession has been delivered even before service of the ex-parte injunction order. Again in that case, it is brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the respondent, the appellant admitted that he alone is the tenant in the premises in question. All these facts have been mentioned in the reply to the show cause notice by the respondent-landlady which are not in dispute before me.