R RAMANUJAM Vs. AJIT SINGH THUKRAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a tenant's Second Appeal against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, by which the Rent Control Tribunal reversed the order of the Controller, dismissing the landlord's application- for the eviction of the tenant, on the ground that on account of the admitted user of a residential premises by the tenant for running a boarding and lodging house in the demised premise's, the tenant was liable to be evicted by virtue of clause (k) to the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, for short, the Act, and remanded the case to the Controller for consideration under sub-section (II) of section 14 of the Act. The Second Appeal was filed in the following circumstances :-

(2.) The premises in dispute, which are admittedly of a residential nature, and built on leasehold land, were let out to the tenant by the predecessor-in-title of the present landlords, the respondents in this appeal There was some controversy at an earlier stage of the proceedings as to the purpose for which the premises were let to the tenant, but it is now established on the material on record that the premises were let out for running of a boarding and lodging house and that is how they have been used by the tenant over the years. The eviction of the tenant, was sought in the proceedings, out of which the present appeal arose, on a number of grounds, but the only ground that now survives is that the tenant had, notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to the condition imposed on the landlord by the Government while giving to the landlord a lease of the land, on which the premises are situated, in that one of the conditions of lease was that the building to be put up on, the leased land would be used for the purpose of a "residential cottage" and that the tenant had admittedly been using the premises for the running of a boarding and lodging house. The application for eviction was contested by the tenant and was dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, as the various grounds of eviction were repelled. The ground for eviction based on the use of the premises for running a boarding and lodging house failed on the short ground, in the state of the law as it stood at that time, that the premises having been proved to have been let out: for the running of a boarding and lodging house on the material on record by the landlord himself, the aforesaid ground envisaged by clause (k) to proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act was not available for the eviction of the tenant. On appeal, the Rent Control Tribunal, by the order in appeal, reversed the order of the Rent Controller in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan, which entitled the landlords to evict a tenant on the aforesaid ground even if the landlord was a party to letting for a purpose other than the land use. The Rent Control Tribunal, however, came to the further conclusion that, even though the tenant had become liable to be evicted on the aforesaid ground, the requirement of sub-section (II) of section 14 had to be satisfied. The Rent Control Tribunal accordingly remanded the case to the Additional Rent Controller for compliance with the requirement of the aforesaid sub-section. During the pendency of the present appeal and in view of the fact that proceedings before the Additional Rent Co" roller on remand were not stayed, an order of eviction has since been passed by the Additional Rent Controller after purported compliance with the requirement of sub-section (II) of section 14 and the final order of eviction now forms subject matter of an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal.

(3.) The first contention that the counsel for the tenant raised was that the requirement of clause (k) had not been satisfied in that there was no "previous notice" from the landlords to the tenant, as envisaged by the said provision, and that, in the absence of such a notice, there was no cause of action for the application for eviction on that ground. This contention appears to be devoid of any force. It had been alleged by the landlords in para (4) of the application that "the respondent has refused to stop the misuse of the premises despite a notice to that effect". There was no specific denial of this allegation in the tenant's reply. Again in para 18(a)(ii), the landlords alleged that "a prescribed notice requiring the respondent to stop the misuse of the premises was issued, but the tenant has refused or failed to comply with such requirements within one month of the date of the notice". In reply to this, the tenant, however, denied that any notice, as alleged, had been received by him or served on him. At the trial of the application, the landlords produced a copy of their notice, dated June 3, 1965, Exhibit A-4, by which counsel for the landlords called upon the tenant "to stop the misuse of the premises and use the same as a residence only within one month of the date of receipt of the notice". This was replied to on behalf of the tenant vide Exhibit A-5, by which the tenant's counsel admitted the receipt of the notice, but declined compliance apparently because of the legal position that then held the field. The application was eventually filed by the landlords on September 17, 1965. It is difficult to accept the contention that, in spite of the aforesaid notice and the averments made in relation to it in the application, there was no previous notice requiring the tenant to desist from the user, which was said to be contrary to the condition imposed on the landlord by the Government. This requirement of the clause was duly satisfied. The contention must, therefore, fail.