RAGHU NATH Vs. CHANDER BHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Authority under Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, dated 19th February, 1980.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioner has very frankly submitted that the amount due ander this order having actually been paid by his client and the respondent being untraceable it will serve no useful purpose to seek variation of the order on the merits, though he has in bis usual quiet manner questioned the correctness of the decision haltingly. He has in seriousness, however, confined his grievance only to the language used by the learned Authority in the impugned order. According to the learned counsel, the language used is much too strong to be used by judicial officers in their judgments and, therefore, ''e descibes it to be unjudicial, which does not deserve to be sustained on the existing judicial record The learned counsei has drawn my attention to that part of the impugned ordr"r where the present petitioner has been described to be a thoroughly untruthful person on whom no reliance could be placed. At another place in the order, the learned Authority has also felt fully convinced that the present petitioner was a person who bad no regard for truth and who had employed all tactics to baulk the claimant's just claim for wages.

(3.) I do realise that the language used by the learned Authority could have been more restrained suggesting a calmer deliberatioa and a more dignified expression because the language in the judgments of the Courts of law and justice, as also of the fribunals discharging quati judicial functions, should not betray prominence of emotion which the impugned order does seem to me to incline to some extent, but the real difficulty in my way is that Courts and quasi jvdicial Tribunals which are called upon to apperaise and evaluate the evidence recorded by them, are expected, from the very nature of things, to possess sufficient freedom to form their own opinion and to give expression to the same. This indeed is their solemn duty and sacred privilege to be performed and exercised judiciously, wholly insulated agair.st extra judicial influences, both persona] and external, including sub conscious pre.dispositions. The legitimate formation and expression of opinion must remain unhamperedd by extraneous consideration. This Court, exercising its constitutional jurisdiction of saperinter.dence inder Article 227 of the Constitution, would thus be hardly justified ordinarily in either expunging the observations made by the Coarts and quasi judictai Tribunals in due evaluation of the evidence recorded by them or in substituting its own language for that used by such Courts and Tribunals.. The power of expunging the remaiks in or changing the language of, the orders of the subordinate Courts and Tribunals, has to be exercised very sparingly and with caution and only if the opinion expressed is wholly unsupportable on the recder or is tainted by flagrantly unjust procedure and the conscience of this Court is pricked by such language, for it is only then that the voice of justice would dictate such a course. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to so hold in this case. This Court, it may be remembered, is not a Court of appeal and if the subordinate Courts and Tribunals act within the limits of their jurigdiction, then ordinary errors or irregularities are normally not gone into under Article 227, particularly when there is no resultant irave and palpable injustice, I would, therefore, conclude this order with a reminder that the Court and quasi judicial Tribunals should always try to use restrained and sober language, free from emotion but indicative of, and consistent with, the deliberative calmness associated with the dignity and status of judicial officers in expressing their opinion even when they disbelieve a witness, and they should normally avoid needlessly provocative and hurtful language.