OM PARKASH SINGAL Vs. ROSHAN LAL KHAIMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a second appeal from order under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act directed against the order of the learned Rent Control Tribunal dated 23rd July, 1968 dismissing the present appellant's appeal and maintaining the order of the learned Rent Controller dated 15th December, 1967, by means of which amendment of the written statement filed by the respondent in this Court was allowed by introducing a plea of want of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The order which is described by the appellant to be arbitrary so far as relevant reads thus :-

(2.) The appellant's learned counsel submits that this order does not show any reasons for exercising the discretion in favour of the respondent in the proceeding which started as far back as May, 1964. It is common case of the parties that about six witnesses for the landlord were examined before the Controller when the application for amendment of the written statement was presented sometime in November, 1967. Shri Vijay Kishan has relied on to begin with a decision of this Court in Pritam Singh v. Suraj Pershad. It was observed in that decision that the Court may at any stage of the proceeding allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and in the larger interests of justice, the Court should, as a general rule, permit amendments which may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties. Such power of amendment is recognised during proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act. It was emphasised in that decision that this power however wide, is discretionary and the discretion is to be exercised on judicial principles. While dealing with sect on 106. Transfer of Property Act, it was observed that this section merely lays down a deeming provision in regard to duration of certain leases in the absence of contract or local usage and provides for their termination by notice specified to be observed in the manner provided. This section, however, does not exclude or prohibit other means of terminating such leases nor does it concern itself with the inherent jurisdiction of the Court empowered to deal with eviction proceedings. Want of notice under this section was accordingly held not to go to the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts of the Rent Controllers under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Reference has next been made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh. Specific reliance has been placed on following observations at P. 324 :-

(3.) The next decision cited is Naresh Chander Mittal v. Bishamber Nath Chopra, but this decision seems to be of little assistance and need not detain me. He has also relied on some unreported decisions of this Court. In Bansi Dhar v. R D. Bansal, R. S. A. 323-D of 1966 decided on 24th October, 1968. after reproducing section 106, Transfer of Property Act, it was observed as under :-