M L BAWEJA Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner is a Dermanent employee of the Accountant-General Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, since 1st July, 1951. On 20th September, 1958, the Accountant General Central Revenues passed an order that the petitioner be placed under suspension under rule l2(b) of the Contral Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeat) Rules, 1957, with effect from the date of relief from his duties. It was further ordered that- "During the period of suspension Shri M. L. Baweja, Divisional Accountant shall be paid the following amounts:-- (a) A subsistence allowance at an amount equal to the leave salary which the Government servant would have drawn if he had bean on leave on half averege pay or half pay and in addition dearness allowance based on such leave salary. (b) Other compereatory allowances, if any, of which Shri Baweja was in receipt on the date of suspension provided that he shall not be entitled to the compensatory allowances unless he satisfies the A.G.C R. that he continues to meet the expenditure for which they are granted. no payment under para 2 above shall be made unless Shri M.L. Baweja, Divisional accountant furnishes a certificate and satisfies the A. G. C. R. that he was not engaged in any other employment, business, profession or vocation during the p?fiod for which the claim is preferred." The reason given for ordering the suspension of the petitioner was that "information has been received that a criminal case has been registered by the Special Police Establishment Ambala on 25th August, 1958, under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 5(2) of Act II of l947" From the order dated 18th October, 1900, made under Fundamental Rule 54(3) (Annexure 'D' to the petition), it apoears that the petitioner was under suspension from 23rd August, 1958, to 13th February, 19fc0. The petitioner was tried by the Special Judge, Ambala, and acquitted by his judgment dated 21st December, 1959. The learned Special Judge discarded the prosecution evidence, and concluded his judgment by saying- "For the above discussion, I bold that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt Giving the aceused used, the benefit of doubt, I acquit him"

(2.) The learned counsel for the parties agree that after the acquittal of the petitioner the matter was governed by Fundamental Rule 54. under the said Rule when a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or suspended is re-instated the authrity competent to order the re-instutement is required to make a specific order. (a) Regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension; and (b) Whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 54" where the authority mentioned in sub- rule (1) is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified the Government servant shall be given the full pay and allowances to which be would have been entitled, had be not been dismissed, removed, 650 compulsorily retired or suspended, as the case may be" In pursuance of Rule 54 it was decided by order dated 18th October, 1980, "that the suspension of Shri M. L. Baweja, Divisional Accountant for the period from 23rd August, 1958 to 13tb February, 1960 has not been unjustified and that the subsistence allowance already sanctined for paymenu to him in para (2) of this office order No................dated 20th September 1958, shall be the pay and allowance which he should receive daring the period.

(3.) The first contention of the learned counsel tor the petitioner is that the petitioner having been exonerated completely by the Special Judge, he was entitled to full pay and allowance to which he would have been entitled he had not been suspended. That does not appear to me to be correct reading of Rule 54(2). Under Rule 12 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1957, it is discretionary with the Appointing Authority to place a Government servant undar suspension where a case against him in respact of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. Consequently, where a challan is filed against a Government servant, as in this case, the Government servant may be placed under suspension and the juatification of the saspansion order has, normally, to be determined on the faces and circumstances as existing on the date of the order and may be held to be justified irrespective of the result of the Criminal case. That is so because justification for the suspension may legitimately be foanded on the fact that a person is being prosecuted on a criminal charge. If that were not so the rule would have provided that in case of acquittal suspension will always be treated as unjastified. In this view I am supported by a Division Bench judgment of the Punjab High Court reported in (R.P. Kapur v. Union of India) I am not concerned in this case with reinstatement after dismissal etc. The question whether the suspension was justified or wholly unjustified with Fondameatal Kale 54(2) will not, therefore, in all cases depend en the result of the prosecution. Circumstances may, however, arise where the concerned authority while pronouncing up on the justification of the suspension order under Fundamental Rule 54(2) may have to take into consideration the judgment rendered in the criminal case. The learned Deputy Advocate-General did not dispute that in a given case such an authority may have to take note of the result of the prosecution and the reasons given by the Court in support of the Government servant's acquittal. If for instance the criminal Court acquits a Government servant on the ground that the case has not been proved against him beyond doubt the suspension order may be held justified on the round of his prosecution alone If on other hand, the Court comes to the conclusion that the person concerned was prosecuted under some mistake the authority may wall come to the come to the conclusion that the suspension older was wholly unjustified that is why tie justification and non-justification has been left to the decision by the authority. I am relieved from the responsibility of deciding whether the order under Fundamental Rule 54(2) is a quasi judicial order or purely an administrative one because the learned Deputy Advocate General conceded that such an order would be a quasi judicial order and the person concerned must be he-aid before the order is made. In fact, be stated that in viaw of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.Gopalkrishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh it was not open to him to contend to the coatrary. The learned counsel for petitioner contended that once it was conceded that the order was a quasijudicial one, the deciding authority must give reasons. For this contention the learned counsel relid on Bhagat Raja v Union ef India and -Jagannath Kashinath Kavalekar v. Union of India and others'. In Bhugat Raja's case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court. were concerned with the question whether in dismissing a revision and confirming the order of a State Government made under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Dgvelopment ) Act, 1967, the Union of India was bound to make a speaking order. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:-