AMAR NATH Vs. SEWA RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondents in this case that the revision is barred by time. Reliance has been placed on Article 131 of the Limitation Act No. 36 of 1983. This Article prescribes a period of 90 days for presenting a revision under the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure, the terminus a quo being the date of the decree or order or sentence sought to be revised. In the case in hand, the order sought to be revised is dated 18th September, 1965 and the revision was presented in this Court on 9th March, 1968. An application for a copy of the order was made on 24th December, 1965, and the same was attested on 25th January, 1966 and perhaps delivered on the same day. Calculating on the basis of these dates the period requisite for obtaining the copy and deducting the same from the time- taken by the petitioner in filing this revision petition, it is not denied that it is barred by time. The only ground on which the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to bring it within limitation is that on 18th September, 1965, the learned Additional Sessions Jadge did not announce orders immediately after hearing the arguments but reserved them to be announced later of which no intimation was ever given to the petitioner. In face of the clear order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that orders were announced soon after hearing the arguments, I find it difficult to accept this contention.

(2.) It is, however, urged that along with this revision, an application tinder section 5 of the Limitation Act was also presented in this Court seeking extention of time and it is submitted that R.P.Khosla, J. of the Punjab High Court, when issuing notice on the revision, expressly recorded condonation of the delay. This, according to Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, is conclusive and, according .to him, the respondents have no right now to re-agitate or re-open this question. I am wholly unable to accept this submission.

(3.) It is well settled on high authority that an ex parts order of this type has inherent in It the order that it is subject to all just exceptions and the respondents are entitled at the time of bearing or at any early stage, if they so choose, to approach this Court to raise the question of limitation. As a matter of fact, the better view seems to me to be that in a case of this type the question of limitation can be decided even prior to the admission of the cause but after hearing both sides. Be that as it may, it is not possible on the basis of the ex parte order condoning the delay in the present case to estop the respondents from raisirg the question of limitation at this stage. This question is allowed to be raised and prima facie the revision is clearly barred by time.