DAROPTI Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER SIMLA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal relates to the construettion of the word "person" used in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the 196l Act).

(2.) The writ petition was filed by the appellant alleging that the suit land in khasra No. 284 had belonged to respondent No 8 Madan Lal by virtue of a sale dated l4th November,IS53 executed by one Shrimati Murtoo. On the 4th March 1955, by virtue of Section 3 of the Pepsn Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter called the 1954 Act), the said land became vested in the Gram Panchavat respondent No.2, as being incinded in Sharniiat Deh of the village. Subsequentiy. however, the definition of Shamilat Deh was changed by the 1961 Act which repealed the 1954 Act with the result that the suit land ceased to be Shamilat Deh. Sub-section (2) of Section 3, which provided for the disposal of such land, is reproduced below:-

(3.) In accordance with the above provision of law, respondent No.3 Madan Lal was the person in whom the right, title and interest in the suit land, which was since then given the khasra No. 284/1, revested in as much as the same had vested in him immediatly before the commencement of "Shamilat Law", which in this connection meant the 1954 Act, as per the definition of "Shamilat Law" in Section 2(h) (ii) of the 1961 Act. On 4th March, 1957, Madan Lal is alleged by the petitioner to have sold the suit land to her and her husband even though prior to that date in pursuance of the 1954 Act. the suit land had already vested in the Gram Panchayat, respondent No. 2. Therefore, when the suit land ceased to be a part of Shamilat Deh because of the enactment of the 1961 Act and the title to it under Section 3(2) thereof revested in the person in whom the title had vested immediately before the commencement of the 1954 Act, the question which arose for consideration was whether the title could be said to have revested in Madan Lal or the petitioner or any oie else or in no one. The learned single Judge in the judgment under appeal construed the word "person" in Section 3(2) of the Act to mean only Madan Lal in as much as be alone was the owner of the land prior to the commencement of Shamilat law. According to the learned Judge, therefore, the Panchayat was bound to return the possession of the suit land to Madan Lal alone. There was no obligation on the Panchayat to deliver possession of the suit land to the petitioner and no writ or direction could, therefore, he issued to the Panchayat directing it to do so.