LAWS(DLH)-2018-3-175

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Vs. VIJAYA C GURSAHANEY

Decided On March 08, 2018
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Appellant
V/S
Vijaya C Gursahaney Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) appeals the decision of learned Single Judge who had quashed its demand of composition fee amounting to Rs. 42,83,618/- made through its circular dated 08.10.2010.

(2.) The facts are that the plot in question (D-3, Community Centre, Naraina, New Delhi) was purchased by one Ramdhan Bhandoola (hereinafter referred to as "the original owner") in an auction by DDA on 25.05.1969. A perpetual lease deed was executed between the President of India and Ramdhan Bhandoola on 17.0197 The original owner died without any construction on the plot. The respondent (hereinafter referred to as "the owner"), applied for Letters of Administration which was granted by the District Judge on 07.05.1980. She subsequently applied to the DDA for substitution of her name as the owner. DDA issued show cause notice for non-construction of the plot within a specified time when the owner sought mutation of the property in her name. This led DDA to demand 50% unearned increase towards what it termed as unauthorized transfer (i.e. through testamentary devolution). The demand was challenged by respondent in W.P.(C) 3696/199 The Division Bench of this court quashed the demand as not legal vide its judgment dated 10.05.1994. The DDA then appealed to the Supreme Court by Special Leave which was allowed on 26.08.2003 and it directed the owner/respondent to pay the 50% unearned increase, as demanded by appellant. The respondent/owner deposited the amount on 210.2003. The respondent/owner had requested for extension of the time granted by the lease deed for construction upon the plot and waiver of composition fee, which was rejected by the DDA and it further demanded Rs. 42,83,618/-.

(3.) The respondent/owner has approached this Court complaining that the calculation of composition fee in the circumstances of the case was improper. The DDA countered the claim and stated that its extant policies do not permit the competent authorities to condone the delay and that condonation was permissible only in certain contingencies. To do so, the DDA relied upon the composition policy, especially Clause 1.4.