UTKARSH APPARELS &ANR Vs. WINNOSME TEXTILES INDUSTRIES LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal impugns an arbitration Award dated 17.02.2015 as well as the order dated 06.07.2017 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, passed in ARB No.283/2017, dismissing the appellants' objections under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') on the ground of it being barred by limitation. The period for filing a challenge under section 34 of the Act is three months from the date of the Award. The appellants had participated in the arbitration proceedings on a few dates and subsequently voluntarily abandoned it, hence, they were proceeded ex parte. For arriving at this conclusion, the impugned order dated 06.07.2017 records:

(2.) A delay of even one day has to be explained by the appellant as a just and sufficient cause for condonation. For the appellant to merely claim that it took time for the copy of the Award to be sent by the counsel in Shimla to the appellants' address is not sufficient since the Court has already taken into consideration that the address of the partner, Sh. Rajender Pahwa, as per his affidavit, is Dhadari Khurd, G.T. Road, Ludhiana, Punjab. The impugned order has carefully considered the consequences of both the relevant dates of knowledge of the Award: if it was 29.11.2014-the day when appearance was entered on its behalf before the executing court in Shimla, then the three months period would expire on 02.07.2015; and if 09.12.2014 is the day on which the award was procured, then the limitation period would expire on 10.03.2015. The objection was not filed within either of the said periods. Since there has been no explanation as to how the period of three months was used, and the fact that the appellant abandoned the arbitration proceedings voluntarily, the only logical inference would be that the appellant was not serious about either the proceedings or its outcome. This casualness seems to have extended beyond the three months period provided under section 34 of the Act and there is no reasonable cause or justification for condoning this delay. Hence the impugned order concluded as it did. It cannot be faulted.

(3.) In the circumstances, the delay is not sufficiently explained. Hence, this Court does not find any ground for condoning the delay nor any reason to interfere with the impugned order.