USHA SAHAI Vs. DELHI SCHOOL TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER is aggrieved by the order dated 22.11.2007 of the Delhi School Tribunal, whereby, the application of the petitioner for condensation of delay in filing the appeal against the termination of her service on 14.5.2004 has been dismissed. It would appear that the petitioner's service was terminated on 14.5.2004. The termination order was admittedly received by the petitioner on 18.5.2004 in the United States of America where she was staying at that time. After receiving this order on 18.5.2004, the petitioner returned to India on 11.8.2004. The period of limitation available to the petitioner for filing the appeal in question against the termination of her service was 90 days. For computing the period of limitation, time started running from 18.5.2004. On her return to India on 11.8.2004, at least 6 days were still available to the petitioner to file her appeal. However, the appeal came to be filed only on 25.11.2004. In her application for condensation of delay, the petitioner has merely stated that;

(2.) NO further particulars are disclosed in the application. Learned Tribunal has gone into the question of condensation of delay. It has found that the appellant has failed to show which documents were collected by the appellant after admittedly having arrived in India on 11.8.2004. It is also noted that no copy of any application seeking these documents has been placed on the record; and that the non filing of such an application makes it impossible to ascertain the exact date on which these documents were applied for; or even whether these documents were sought from the school, or from any other authority. In other words, the learned Tribunal has concluded that the plea of the petitioner seeking condensation of delay is bereft of material particulars. The Tribunal has dealt with this aspect in the following terms:

(3.) EVEN otherwise, the argument advanced by the Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the jurisdiction to condone delay ought to have been exercised on the sole ground that a 'substantial question of law' is involved in the case or, in other words, the mere existence of a substantial question of law can be termed as a cause sufficient to condone the delay, is too broad a proposition and cannot be countenanced at law. From the impugned order, I find that the petitioner relied on the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. : (1987)ILLJ500SC , but the Delhi School Tribunal held it to be not applicable to the facts of the case. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that a liberal approach is adopted to determine whether sufficient cause exists or not as it is realized that: