DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION Vs. HARPAL SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BRIEF facts giving rise to the filing of this l. P. A. are: (i) That the respondent workman was employed with the appellant as a Security guard. On June 5, 1991 while returning to his house after discharging his duties, he met with an accident and sustained grievous injuries rendering him unsuitable for employment as security guard, thereafter he proceeded on medical leave. He was referred to DTC medical board where he refused to appear. He was prematurely retired from service w. e. f. February 22, 1994 vide letter dated May 18, 1994. The respondent aggrieved by the aforesaid order raised a Industrial Dispute before the Conciliation Officer, Delhi administration for issuing directions to the management for reinstating him in service. Govt. of NCT of Delhi referred the dispute between the respondent and the appellant to the labor Court registered as I. D. No. 118/1996; (ii) The same was adjudicated upon by the presiding Officer, Labor Court VII. Vide order dated February 18, 2002 an award was given in favor of the respondent directing inter alia his reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. It was further held that if the workman cannot be retained as a Security guard, the management shall deal with his case in terms of the provisions of Section 47 of the persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities protection of Rights And Full Participation)Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said act'), as those provisions will prevail over any other administrative guidelines laid down by the management. The said Act came into being only in 1995 and was not applicable when the respondent suffered injury or was terminated out of service as the said Act was enforced only on February 7, 1996; (iii) The award delivered by the Labor Court was upheld by a learned single Judge of this Court who was pleased to dismiss the writ petition filed by the appellant-corporation being C. W. P. No. 2735/2003 for quashing the award. It is this judgment delivered on April 25, 2003 which is the subject matter of adjudication before us.

(2.) IT is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the primary question to be gone into by this Court in this l. P. A. is as to "whether the provisions of section 47 of the said Act can have retrospective operation. " It is his contention that this is not the mandate of the Act. He has also relied upon the following judgments: i) P. Mahendran and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others AIR 1990 SC 405 : (1990) 1 SCC 411 : 1990-I-LLJ-337. ii) Land Acquisition officer-cum-DSWO v. B. V. Reddy and Sons AIR 2002 SC 1045 : (2002) 3 SCC 463 iii) Shyam sunder and Others v. Ram Kumar and Another air 2001 SC 2472 : (2001) 8 SCC 24 iv)Raminder Singh Sethi v. D. Vijayarangam, AIR 2002 SC 2087 : (2002) 4 SCC 675 v) Union of india v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96 vi) State Bank of India and Others v. Jaspal kaur Appeal (civil) No. 409/2007 decided on february 1, 2007, vii) C. Gupta v. Galxosmithklin Pharmaceutical Ltd. Appeal (Civil) No. 6543-44/2004 decided on May 23, 2007 a) In the case of P. Mahendran and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others (supra) it has been held: "that it is well settled rule of construction that every statute or statutory Rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Unless there are words in the statue or in the Rule showing the intention to affect the existing rights the Rule must be held to be prospective. " b) In the case of Land acquisition officer-cum-DSWO v. B. V. Reddy and Sons (supra) it has been held that: " it is well settled principle of construction that a substantive provision cannot be retrospective in nature unless the provision itself indicates the same. '' c) In the case of Shyam Sunder and others v. Ram Kumar and Another (supra) it has been held that: " there is no such rule of construction that a beneficial legislation is always retrospective in operation even though such legislation either expressly or by necessary intendment is not made retrospective. " d) In the case of Raminder Singh sethi v. D. Vijayarangam (supra) it has been held that: "ordinarily the rights of the parties to litigation stand crystallized on the date of commencement of lis. Any new provision does not apply to the pending litigation. " e) In the case of Union of India v. Deoki Nandan aggarwal (supra) it has been held that: "the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Courts. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into which are not there. " In the case of State Bank of India and Others v. Jaspal Kaur (supra), the apex Court was pleased to hold: " that the scheme of Compassionate Appointment formulated by the Bank in 2005 could not be applied to an application for compassionate appointment made in 2000 under the old scheme prevailing at that time. "

(3.) ON the other hand, the respondent has submitted that the said Act being a welfare legislation, the provisions of Section 47 of the said Act must be given retrospective operation. It is also submitted that even de hors the provisions of the aforesaid act, such benefits had been granted in the past keeping in view of the spirit of the said Act and the history of legislation as well as the Constitutional provisions. They have also relied upon various judgments on this point as follows: i) Order dated January 29, 2002 in C. W. P. 722/1998 titled as DTC v. Shri Ganpat Singh AIR 1995 sc 519 ii) State of Haryana v. Narinder Kumar chawla AIR 1995 SC 519 : (1994) 4 SCC 460 iii) Baljeet Singh v. Delhi Transport corporation, 2000-III-LLJ (Supp)-339 (Del)a) In the case of DTC v. Shri Ganpat Singh (supra) it has been held that the workman therein be taken back into service and be paid salary from the date when the salary was stopped after termination of service. In that case, the petitioner met with an accident on march 7, 1987 and fractured his bones in his right leg and the Medical Board declared him to be medically unfit. This happened much before the said Act came into force. An Industrial dispute was referred to by the workmen which was decided in his favor relying upon the earlier pronouncements. He was directed to be re instated in service with full back wages. Benefits of the provisions of the said Act were also given effect to and it was further ordered that in case the petitioner was not fit to perform his duty then his case to be dealt within terms of proviso to Section 47 of the said Act. The learned single Judge upheld the award in the light of previous pronouncement without deciding the question of the applicability of the act retrospectively as the said issue was not before the Court at that time. b) In the case of state of Haryana v. Narinder Kumar Chawla (supra) it has been held that: