P.C. SHARMA Vs. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BOTH the petitions with respect to separate arbitration proceedings, but between the same parties and involving identical facts, have been preferred under Sections 5, 11 and 12 of the Old Arbitration Act, 1940 with the prayer for removal of the respondent No. 2 (also same in both the petitions) appointed as the sole arbitrator by the respondent No. 1 DDA and for appointment of an independent arbitrator. Replies have been filed by the respondent No. 1 to both the petitions. However, the counsel for the petitioner, during the hearing, did not press for the relief of change of arbitrator but only pressed/argued for extension of time under Section 28 of the Act for extension of time for making of the award. The counsel for the respondents in each of the cases have opposed the said prayer for extension of time on the ground of the same being barred by time. The power of the court to extend the time for making of the award was not disputed and, in fact, Mr Gaurav Sarin, counsel for the respondent in one of the cases himself, cited Hari Krishna Wattal v. Vaikunth Nath Pandya : [1974]1SCR259 and The Hindustan Construction Co Ltd v. Governor of Orissa and Ors. : [1995]2SCR441 .

(2.) IN the facts of the cases, three questions fall for adjudication i.e., (1) In the absence of the petitioner having filed the petition under Section 28 of the Act for extension of time, can an order extending the time for making of the award be made in the present petition; (2) Whether the prayer of the petitioner for extension of time is barred by time; (3) If the aforesaid two questions are answered in favour of the petitioner, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, grounds for extension of time for making of the award are made out.

(3.) THE petitioner preferred appeals against the said order being FAO(OS) 319/2006 and FAO(OS) 320/2006 to the Division Bench of this Court against the said order. The Division Bench held, vide order dated 3rd May, 2006 that the appellant remained silent for over four years after the proceedings were adjourned sine die and the delay in the disposal of the arbitration proceedings was attributable to the petitioner and dismissed the appeals in limine. I may clarify that the arbitration proceedings were adjourned sine die on 15th September, 1998 and OMPs were filed in the year 2001 i.e., after nearly three years and not four years, as apparently erroneously recorded in the order of the Division Bench.