HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY Vs. UDAY SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondent was a Civil Judge at Nasik. It was alleged that on 21.10.89, he conveyed message to Kundanben, Deft. in eviction suit demanding P.s. 1,000.00 for deciding in her favour. She told her lawyer of this who told. Asstt. Govt. Advocate. Latter conveyed this to the Govt. Advocate who in turn complained to Distt. Judge. Latter recorded adverse remarks against respondent in confidential file. Civil Judge asked High Court to expunge remarks. High Court asked Distt. Judge to enquire and after receipt of same ordered Disclipinary enquiry. On receipt of report. High Court took the view that integrity of respondent was doubtful and called for penal action. After taking explanation of the Judge, High Court ordered his dismissal. Respondent challenged his dismissal by filing W.P. in High Court. It was allowed and the state apprealed to to Supreme Court. After detailing above facts, judgment is :

(2.) Shri Harish Salve, learned senior counsel apprearing for the appellant contends that the view taken by the Division Bench is not correct in law. Under judicial review court cannot re-appreciate the evidence of witnesses and reach its own conclusion. The Court could have seen on the basis of evidence on record whether a reasonable man would reach the conclusion that the respondent was actuated with the corrupt motive in making demand for illegal gratification tor discharge of official duty (he High Court, therefore has over-stepped its limits of judicial review and the conclusion reached cannot be supported either by principle of law or any of the law laid down by this Court. Shri Lambai, learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand contends that on the basis of evidence on record no reasonable man would reach the conclusion that the respondent has committed any act of misconduct i.e. demand of illegal gratification. The subsequent statements of the advocates and of the complainant show that it is only face saving attempt made by the District Judge to substantiate the adverse remarks made by the District Judge when the respondent brought these facts on record. The Disciplinary Committee did not consider the same from this perspective. So they cannot form as foundation for taking disciplinary action against the respondent.

(3.) Having regard to the respective contentions, the question that arises for considerations is whether the view taken by the Division bench is sustainable in law ? As regards the nature of the judicial review, it is not necessary to trace the entire case law. A bench of three Judges of this Court has considered its scope in recent judgment in B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Qrs. [(1995) 6 SCC 749] in which the entire case law was summed up in paragraphs 12,14 and 15 thus : "Judicial review is not appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are compelled with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction power and authority to reach a finding 10 fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts the evidence and conclusion receives support there from the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge." "14. In Union of India Vs. S.L. Abbas [(1993) 4 CC 357] when the order of transfer was interfered with by the Tribunal this Court held that the Tribunal was not an appellate authority which could substitutes own judgment to that bona fide order of transfer. The Tribunal could not in such cirumstances interfere with orders of transfer of a government servant. In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli Vs. H.P. Vora [1993 Supp. (1) SCC 551] it was held that the Administrative Tribunal was not an appellate authority and it could not substitute the role of authorities to clear the efficiency bar of a public servant. Recently in State Bank of India Vs. Samarahdra Kishore Endow [(1994) 2 SCC 537] a Bench of this Court in which two of us (B.P. in Jeevan Reddy and B.L. Hansaria JJ) were members considered the order of the Tribunal which quashed the charges as based on no evidence, went in detail into the questions as to whether the Tribunal had power to appreciate the evidence while exercising power of judicial review and held that a tribunal could not appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion to that of the disciplinary authority. It would there force be clear that Tribunal cannot embark upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its own findings of fact to that of a disciplinary/appellate authority." "15. It is therefore difficult to go into the question whether the appellant was in possession of property dispropostionate to the known sources of his income. The findings of the disciplinary authority and that of the Enquiry Officer are based on evidence collected during the inquiry. They reached the findings that the appellant was in possession of Rs. 30,000.00 in excess of his satisfactorily accounted for assets from his known source of income. The alleged gifts to his wife as Stridhana and to his children on their birthday were disbelieved. It is within the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to reach that conclusion. There is evidence in that behalf."