ESCOTEL MOBILE COMMUNICATION LIMITED Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present petition is directed against the respondents for quashing the Circular No. 842-65(B)/95 dated January 16, 1997 issued by respondent No. 1. The said Circular may be reproduced as follows:

(2.) The present petition on the basis of the averments and contentions as made above, will clearly establish that the disputes have arisen between the parties as to whether Panchkula will form part of Haryana Telecom circle or will be included in Chandigarh/Punjabi circle. The matter is not free from doubt and the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not be an appropriate remedy as the controversy raised between the parties will require adjudication of facts and the interpretation of tender documents. The licence agreement provides an arbitration clause which will determine the inter-se disputes and differences between the parties. The petitioners are, therefore, provided with an equally efficacious alternative remedy which they can take recourse to.

(3.) The learned counsel has raised the plea that respondents I and 2 are bound by the principles as incorporated in the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. The respondents have clearly by words and subsequent conduct held out to the petitioners that Panchkula will form part of the Haryana Telecom circle whereas the learned counsel for the respondents have argued that there has been no unequivocal promise which intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship between the parties. The doctrine has been explained in the judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others AIR 1979 Supreme Court 621. The relevant passage may be referred to as below: "The true principle of promissory estoppel, therefore, seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not."