LAWS(DLH)-1997-2-80

NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION Vs. KAMLA SHARMA

Decided On February 13, 1997
NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION Appellant
V/S
KAMLA SHARMA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent, under whom the petitioner company is admittedly a tenant, instituted a suit for possession and for recovery of mesne profits/damages etc. In response to the same the petitioner company moved an application under section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter called the Act) alleging that since an enquiry had already been held under section 16 and a scheme was already under preparation or consideration within the meaning of section 17 of the said Act therefore, the suit was not maintainable. The learned Additional District Judge, however, did not agree. He dismissed the application. Hence this civil revision.

(2.) The perusal of the application under section 22 of the Act would go to show that the company had challenged the maintainability of the suit only so far as it related to the relief for mesne profits/damages etc. It did not say that the suit for possession too could not lie. I am mentioning this because now it has been argued before me that even the suit for possession would not lie. Thus a submission has been made which was conspicuous by its absence in the application. I may also mention by way of preliminaries that the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that as far as the claim for mesne profit or damages for use and occupation is concerned, the respondent-plaintiff would approach for consent as required under the Act and that it may be taken that she is now pressing the suit only as far as it relates to the relief for possession.

(3.) With the preliminaries over it may be mentioned that the entire arguments revolved around a judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. Vs. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. & Anr. (1993) 2 SCC 144. It was contended that in the light of the said judgment the word "proceedings" in section 22(1) has to be broadly construed so as not to confine it to "legal proceedings" as used in the marginal note with the provisions, and that where an enquiry is pending under section 16/17 of the Act or an appeal is pending under section 25 of the Act there should be cessation of the coercive activities of the type mentioned in Section 22(1). The learned counsel submitted that suit for possession was nothing but a coercive activity within the meaning of the said provision.