LAWS(DLH)-1987-3-63

CAMBRIDGE FOUNDATION EDUCATION SOCIETY Vs. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Decided On March 02, 1987
CAMBRIDGE FOUNDATION EDUCATION SOCIETY Appellant
V/S
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision is directed against the order of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi who had passed an order on an application filed under Order 23 Rule I by the petitioner-herein who, by the said application, had sought leave to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh one.

(2.) The plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration and injunction. In the plaint it is alleged that the D.D.A. had agreed to allot approxmately two acres of land to the petitioner. It is further alleged that D.D.A. wanted to favour respondent No. 2-herein and allotted the land to them though the land is meant for the petitioner. The prayer in the suit is for declaration that the land in question, which is adjacent to the petitioner's existing School, is meant for school purposes and is ear-marked in the Master Plan and in the Zonal Plan for the petitioner only and for a further declaration that the petitioner-plaintiff is entitled to the allotment of land. There is also a prayer for a decree for permanent injunction and for restraining defendant No. I and its employees from allotting the land in question to anybody else.

(3.) In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 a preliminary objection has been taken to the effect that the suit was not Maintainable and was liable to be dismissed because no notice for two months before filing of the suit had been given by the plaintiff to the D.D.A. It is further alleged that there was no application under section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for exemption of such a notice. The case of the said respondent was that in the absence of such a notice, the suit was not maintainabk. In reply to the application filed under order 23 rule I, which application was filed by the petitioner-herein, the respondent D.D.A also took a similar preliminary objection. It was contended on behalf of the D.D.A. that the suit was liable to be dismissed for want of notice under section 53-B of the D.D.A. Act.