(1.) We are called upon to answer the following question which has been referred to us by a Bench consisting of Hegde. C. J. and Shankar, J :
(2.) Before us also, it is not dispute^ that a decree made by a Tribunal wanting in inherent jurisdiction to make the decree, would be a nullity and that the executing Court would, in such a case, be fully justified to decline to execute such a decree. The submission which has been strongly pressed before us is that the Tribunal has been given the power to decide whether or not aparticular transaction is a debt and whether or not a particular party is a debtor or a creditor as contemplated by the Act, with the result that any opinion expressed by the Tribunal on these questions would be final and conclusive, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the civil-Courts to reopen those conclusions. Support for this submission has primarily been sought from the majority view of the Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Parkash Textile Mills Ltd., and some other decisions. Before dealing with those decisions, we consider it proper to point out that though at the initial stage of the arguments the learned counsel for the appellant was inclined to urge that the Court executing the decree made by the Tribunal only functions as a Tribunal arid not as a civil Court, hut after going through the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd., AIR 1956 S.C. 614(4), it was conceded that the civil Court executing a decree or order passes by a Tribunal under the Act is a civil Court. In view of this express concession, we do not consides it necessary to go into the scheme of the Act and we are proceeding on the assumption that the Court while executing the decree or order made by a Tribunal under the Act function as a civil Court.
(3.) Now, it is axiomatic that an order or decree made by a Court lacking in inherent jurisdiction is a nullity because the Court could not have seizin of the case. If the decree or order is a nullity in the sense just stated, then it would be non-est and the executing Court would, for obvious reasons, be entitled to go into the question of want of inherent jurisdiction of the Court making the decree or order and decline to execute it if it holds it to be a nullity. In Ledgard v. Bull, I.L.R. 9 All. 191(P.C.)(5) Lord Watson, speaking for the Board, observed as follows :