D.T.C Vs. CHANDER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 17 years after his appointment, the respondent, a low paid conductor with the petitioner, was - at the instance of an apparently disgruntled co-worker - removed from service, on the ground that the institution from which he had obtained his matriculation was not an institution whose certificates were recognized for employment with the Central Government. Allegations of "cheating", "fraud" and "suppression" were heaped on the respondent, despite the fact that his certificate had - admittedly - been seen, by the petitioner, not only at the time of his original appointment, but, as the respondent would aver (which is not rebutted) even later at the stage of his confirmation and periodically while inspecting his service book, and despite the fact that the petitioner was itself unsure of the issue, for which it had to secure the opinion of the Department of Personnel & Training ("DOPT"). The matter travelled, inexorably, to the learned Industrial Tribunal, which declared the removal, of the respondent, from service, to be illegal, and directed his reinstatement with back wages, by which time four years had passed since his removal. The petitioner moved this Court by means of the present writ petition. Recovery proceedings were stayed, but no stay of reinstatement was granted. The petitioner, nevertheless, did not reinstate the respondent, and, in the process, these proceedings have languished in this court for 13 long years. In his application, filed under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the respondent stated, on oath, that he had not been able to secure any alternative employment. There is no reason to believe that the situation has changed.

(2.) Removal of a low paid employee, such as a conductor, from service, has far-reaching consequences. It amounts to a civil death. It eviscerates not only the livelihood of the employee concerned but has the perilous potentiality of wiping out his entire family, and all others dependent on him for sustenance. It is a step which is to be taken only after complete application of mind and only where the circumstances are such as make it impossible to retain the employee in service. The degree of care and caution to be exercised in such cases is of the highest order and anything that falls short thereof suffers from malice in fact and in law.

(3.) The respondent has not turned up, before me, to contest these proceedings. I do not know whether he is alive, or dead and neither does the petitioner. Whether this order would, in the ultimate eventuate, have any meaning, for anyone, is a moot question. Are we, at the end of it all, serving the cause of justice