BIJENDER KUMAR Vs. FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER AND ORS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal impugns a judgment and order of a learned Single Judge, which dismissed a writ petition that had challenged a mutation entry in respect of land being 30 bighas 4 biswas in Khasra No. 485/1, Village Bijwasan, Delhi.

(2.) The facts are that the appellant's father, Raja Ram owned the said property; he died without a son. The suit lands were mutated (entered in the name of) Khazani, his daughter (and the appellant's mother) soon after his death. The appellant's contention before the learned Single Judge, in his writ petition, filed after his pleas were turned down by the lower revenue officials (and the Financial Commissioner) was that the land could not devolve upon his mother because, by virtue of Section 50(p) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 (DLRA) on the death of Raja Ram, mutation should have been recorded in his name; inadvertently, the name of his mother Khazani was recorded. The appellant was a minor at that time; he was born on 01.04.1971. The mutation by the revenue authorities of the suit land in the name of his mother contravened Section 50(p) of DLRA.

(3.) Khazani died in 1974. The land was mutated in the name of the appellant on 16.10.1993 and this state of facts continued till when the Mutation Officer recorded the name of Phool Kaur as the recorded owner of the suit property. This was on the strength of a sale deed executed by Khazani in favour of Phool Kaur. The appellant urged that this sale deed was void as Khazani was never the original owner of the property and she could not have transferred this land to Phool Kaur. He also argued that Section 33 of the DLRA also prohibits such transfer and where as a result of the transfer, the transferor is left with less than 8 standard acres of land and thus such a transaction (which is in contravention of that provision) is void under Section 45 of the said Act. The entire sale pursuant to which the land was mutated in favour of Phool Kaur is a void transaction. It was also argued that the appellant's father, Chandan, got remarried and the stand which he took in a pending suit, was prejudicial to the interest of the appellant who was then a minor and, therefore, not binding upon him.