GVK POWER Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this batch of petitions, there is a challenge to Sec. 16 of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Second Ordinance, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Ordinance) and Rule 14 of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Rules, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Rules'). These provisions have been challenged on the ground that they are violative of Articles 14, 19 and 300-A of the Constitution. We may point out, at this juncture, that the said Ordinance has since been replaced by the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015. The provisions, however, which are relevant for our purposes, remain the same.

(2.) The present batch of petitions is by prior allottees of coal blocks which had been cancelled by the Supreme Court by virtue of its judgment dated 25.08.2014 [Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary & Others: 2014 (9) SCC 516] read with its order dated 24.09.2014 [Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary & Others: 2014 (9) SCC 614]. Thereafter, the concerned coal blocks / coal mines were put to auction. The Successful Bidders in the said auctions were to take over the coal mines. However, the prior allottees were to be compensated for the land in relation to the coal mines as also for the mine infrastructure. Sec. 16, as will be seen later, provides for the quantum of compensation for the land in relation to the coal mines as also for the "mine infrastructure'. Rule 14 of the said Rules provides for the manner of determination of compensation to the prior allottees and for the lodging of the registered sale deeds. The plea of the petitioners is that these provisions are ex facie unjust, unfair and unreasonable. They are arbitrary and result in the petitioners (prior allottees) not receiving fair and just compensation in respect of the land and the mine infrastructure and in the Successful Bidders benefiting at the cost of the prior allottees. It is, therefore, the case of the petitioners that the said provisions be struck down. It is also their case that the said provisions suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of essential legislative functions.

(3.) On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submit that the compensation to be computed in terms of the said impugned provisions is neither illusory nor expropriatory. It was also submitted that a provision of a statute can be challenged only on two grounds:- (a) lack of legislative competence; or (b) as being violative of any of the rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution. It was contended that in the present case, no issue of legislative competence arises because the impugned provisions have been challenged only on the ground that they are violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. It was also contended on behalf of the respondents that the said Ordinance (and, subsequently, the Act) would be protected under Art. 31-C of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it is a law towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community ("coal' in the present case) are so distributed to best subserve the common good [see: Art. 39(b) of the Constitution of India]. Even apart from this, it has been urged on behalf of the respondents that, in any event, the impugned provisions do not violate Articles 14 or 19 and also do not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of essential legislative functions.