DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Vs. R S JINDAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for condonation of delay of 216 days in filing of this intra court appeal against the judgment dated 17th December, 2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2300/1997. This application was allowed vide Order dated 9th November, 2005. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent-Mr. R. S. Jindal by its order dated 3rd November, 2003 with the direction that this application would be heard afresh along with the present Letters Patent appeal filed by the appellant-Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as DDA, for short ).

(2.) THE Respondent has relied upon several judgments. We do not propose to separately refer to these judgments as the principles of Law are well settled. Delay in filing of an appeal has to be satisfactorily or reasonably explained. However, it is not each days delay that is to be put under scanner nor is it a fault finding exercise by the Courts. Unless it is a case of gross negligence, Courts are liberal in condoning delays where proper explanation and cause for the delay has been set out. Courts dispense justice and therefore unless there are reasons to hold that the delay was deliberately occasioned for gaining an advantage and benefit, a meritorious matter should not be dismissed on the ground of limitation. At the same-time we are gradually but certainly moving in the direction of stricter compliance with provisions prescribing time limits and limitation. Normally, no distinction is made between an application for condonation of delay filed by a private party and the Government or public authorities. Government and public authorities should comply with the limitations periods prescribed by law just as it's subjects, if not lead by setting an example. However, Courts are conscious that exerting standard should not be applied in all circumstances and care has to taken about disabilities and the ground reality. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandramani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132 has accepted the fact that on account of impersonal machinery, file pushing and inherent bureaucratic methodology imbued in Government and public authorities, decision making process is slow and considerable time is taken, thereby causing delay, sometimes intentionally and sometimes otherwise. In these circumstances the Supreme Court has held that the expression "sufficient cause" should be viewed from a pragmatic and justice oriented approach. Similar observations have been made in the State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005)3 SCC 752 and it has been opined that the term "sufficient cause", should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice oriented approach rather than technical detection of sufficient cause for every day's delay.

(3.) DDA has explained the delay, inter alia, stating that after the judgment dated 17th December, 2002 was passed, the same was made subject matter of rectification/modification of certain typographical errors on an application filed by the respondent. The application was disposed of on 28th February, 2003 with certain corrections in the judgment dated 17th december, 2002. It is further explained that due to mistake/error in the office of counsel of the DDA, certified copy of the Order dated 28th February, 2003 was not applied for. When the default came to notice of the counsel for DDA after verification of records, on 30th May, 2003 certified copy of the Order dated 28th February, 2003 was applied for and received on 9th June, 2003. The certified copy was sent to the office of DDA by the counsel along with his written opinion/notes on 9th July, 2003. It is further stated in the application that the matter had to be examined by Chief Vigilance Officer in DDA whose views/notes were. received on llth August, 2003 and thereafter it was decided that an intra court appeal should be filed. By order dated 14th August, 2003, the file was entrusted to the counsel for drafting of an appeal. Correspondence were exchanged between the counsel and DDA and upon receiving the relevant papers, the counsel drafted the grounds of appeal and the appeal was filed on 1st September, 2003. It may be stated here that DDA has also filed an affidavit of the counsel who was handling the matter before the learned Single Judge. Counsel has admitted that the contents of the application for condonation of delay are correct. Thus admitting default of his office in applying for the certified copy.