(1.) THE plaintiff, claiming to be a Mahant of Kalkaji Mandir, has filed the present suit for declaration, possession and injunction through his attorney Mr. Satish Kumar. The attorney is the natural born brother of the mahant.
(2.) THE case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff is the lawful owner of 50% share of Khasra No. 629 measuring 4 bigha 2 biswa, Khasra No. 630 measuring 18 bigha 9 biswa, Khasra No. 633, 633/1, 633/2 and 633/2/1 measuring 185 bigha and 1 biswa in Village Bahapur. Out of this total land, certain portions of the land were acquired by different awards by the government of India in all the six khasra numbers. The remaining land after acquisition is stated to be 45 bigha and 10 biswa out of which the share of the plaintiff is stated to be 22 bigha and 15 biswa.
(3.) THE plaintiff claims that after demarcation of the land which resulted in Suit No. 342/1991, the plaintiff approached the Director (Lands) DDA and asked him to restore the land occupied and fenced by the DDA which measured 22 bigha and 15 biswa as the same was never acquired. It is the case of the plaintiff that the right of such property being enjoyed by the DDA is without authority of law. The Director of DDA informed the plaintiff that the suit land was transferred to the DDA in the year 1982 by the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India under a package deal in pursuance to the letter dated 4/1978-55-11 on 'as is where is basis'. This position is naturally disputed by the plaintiff and it is the case of the plaintiff that the public authority cannot enjoy and acquire land except by due process of law under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The plaint sets out the cause of action for filing the suit as having arisen in the first week of January, 1998 when the plaintiff discovered that the DDA was fencing the land and apparently raised boundary walls encompassing the said land and started developing the same into a green area by trespassing in the suit property of the plaintiff. The period of limitation being 12 years, it is claimed that the cause of action had arisen only in the first week of January, 1998 and, thus, the suit was within time.