NARINDER KUMAR MUNJAL Vs. DDA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals are directed against the impugned judgment dated 18.5.1999 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition Nos.1037/89, 1090/89, 1091/89 & 1092/89. By the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants herein and upheld the validity of an order being EO No. 1414, dated 7.4.1989 issued by the Respondent DDA promoting certain Junior Engineers as Assistant Engineers on a regular pay scale.

(2.) The brief facts leading to the present appeals are that the appellants were employed as Junior Engineers with the respondent DDA. There were 25 posts of Assistant Engineers (AE) (Electrical) lying vacant in 1983 which were required to be fulfilled by way of promotion from among the Junior Engineers (Electrical) from the category of Degree Holders and Diploma Holders for which minimum eligibility was three years and eight years, respectively. It appears that a meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee was held in 1983 which considered the promotion of the appellants for the posts of AE (Electrical). However, admittedly, the appellants at that point of time were short of six to nine months for being eligible to be promoted. Accordingly, by the order EO No. 3497, dated 22.8.83, the appellants were permitted to officiate as AE (Electrical) on "current duty charge basis." Thereafter the Departmental Promotion Committee held two meetings on 29.3.89 and 31.3.89. By this time all the appellants had the requisite number of years of minimum service required for being considered for promotion as AE (Electrical). However, by an order E.O. No. 1414, dated 7.4.89, the respondent No. 1 promoted certain other persons as AE (Electrical) but left out the appellants altogether from the said list. The appellants thereafter filed writ petitions challenging the said impugned order dated 7.4.89. During the pendency of these writ petitions, the appellant were promoted as AE in December, 1990. Therefore, the surviving grievance of the appellants was that had they been promoted on 7.4.89 itself, they would have counted their seniority, and would be entitled to other consequential benefits from that date.

(3.) This appeal was heard at some length on 20.7.2006 and the following order was passed: