PUSHPA WATI Vs. MAHENDRA KUMAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present petition is directed against the judgment dated September 7, 1987 passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, rejecting the petition for eviction moved under Section 14(l)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').

(2.) The brief facts of the case are that the respondents are the tenants in respect of two bed rooms with attached bath room, drawing-cum-dining room, one kitchen and whole verandah in front and rear and one servant quarter with W.C. on the ground floor of the premises bearing No. 25-C(new) 78/48 (Old) Rajdoot Marg, Diplomatic Enclave, New Delhi for residential purpose at the rate of Rs. 550.00 per month. The petitioner contended before the Rent Controller that the suit premises were let out to the respondents for a period of 11 months with effect from December 1, 1965 by a written agreement with an option to the tenants to continue in the premises with the consent of the petitioner for another 11 months on the same terms and conditions subject to giving advance notice in writing of atleast one month prior to the expiry of said period. The notice dated April 9,1976 was served in this regard. The petitioner further alleged that she was the owner of the suit premises and her husband Tej Ram Berry was a Government servant and he was due to retire in February, 1977. Her family consisted of self, her husband, four sons and two daughters at the time of filing of the eviction petition. One of the sons was married and three were grown up and were to be married. They could not be married due to lack of accommodation. Similarly one of the daughters was married. It was alleged that she and her husband and two children mostly remained with the petitioner. Her second daughter was a student and unmarried. The petitioner was living in the accommodation in A-76, South Extension Part-11, New Delhi which was rented by her husband. The accommodation in the premises was too meagre for her growing family. It is not in dispute that suit for eviction has been filed by the landlord in respect of the premises at A-76, South Extension, Part II, New Delhi which is pending consideration before the Court of Additional Rent Controller. Therefore, in this background it was argued that the petitioner had no reasonably suitable residential accommodation for her big growing family and family members dependent upon her. The premises accordingly were required bona fide for herself and for the use and occupation of other family members.

(3.) The respondents contested the proceedings and filed written statement wherein they took the plea that the petitioner was not the owner of the premises or they were not let out for residential purposes alone and reiterated that she did not require the same bona fide for her husband and for the residence of her other family members. The premises though initially let out for residential purposes, part of the premises was permitted to be used for office of the respondents with the consent of the petitioner. Therefore, the original terms of tenancy as indicated in letter dated December 1,1965 were changed whereby the respondents were allowed to use the premises for both purposes of residence and office. The respondents had also been paying the penalty as imposed by the Land and Development Office over and above the agreed rate as well as the additional house tax imposed in view of part of the premises being used for office purposes. It was alleged that the petitioner was comfortably residing in the accommodation in her possession. All the persons as mentioned did not form part of her family and were not dependent upon her. Her married daughter and her family are not the members of the petitioner's family and even otherwise they were not residing with her. It was further pleaded that the first and Barsati floors which were vacated were not occupied within two months of getting possession as was required under the provisions of Section 19 of the Act. The said tenant on the first floor and Barsati floor had already moved an application under the above said provision for restoration of the possession of the said portion. This application, it is stated by learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has since been dismissed in default on 25th January, 1991. Therefore, in this background, the requirement of the petitioner could not, in any manner, be termed as bona fide.