LAWS(DLH)-1996-12-32

LAHORI SINGH Vs. LARSEN AND TOUBRO LIMITED

Decided On December 09, 1996
LAHORI SINGH Appellant
V/S
LARSEN AND TOUBRO LIMITED Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Appellant Lahori Singh was employed as Clerk with M/s Larson & Toubro Ltd. He was to retire at the age of 58 years. He offered to be medically examined and thereafter given extention till the age of 60 years. The employer/ respondent declined his offer. He felt aggrieved with the attitude of the respondent because according to him the respondent could not retire him from service till he completed the age of 60 years. To take the benefit of 60 years he placed reliance on the settlements arrived at between the Management and Larson & Toubro Workers Union of which the appellant No.1 is a member. The latest settlement relied by him was dated 30th December,1993. This was entered into between the Union and the Management at Bombay. As per this Clause No.6.3.1 the age of retirement is 58 years, but the same is extendable depending on the requirement of the company at its descretion subject to medical fitness by the Company's medical officer for another period of two years. Relying on this clause the appellant contended that since he was medically fit and offered himself to be medically examined by the Medical Officer of the Company hence his retirement age had to be extended by the respondent. The respondent without assigning any reason discriminated the appellant vis.a.vis. other employees whose date of retirement had been extended for two years. If his date of retirement had been extended he would not have to retire on 8th April,1994. Feeling aggrieved he filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction and also claimed damages.

(2.) By the impugned order dated 16th February,1995, the learned Additional District Judge returned the plaint holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. That the appellant should approach the Labour Court which is the competent forum. Against that order this appeal has been preferred, primarily on the ground that Civil Court is competent to entertain the suit because his case was based on the general law of contract. In the suit he had claimed damages which the Labour Court could not award. Hence the dismissal of the suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was bad. The respondent without affording him any opportunity of being heard could not reject his request. Hence, suit is the only remedy. His claim in the suit is based on the breach of contract for which the proper forum is the Civil Court. Moreover, learned Trial Court did not record evidence yet decided the question of jurisdiction which is a mixed question of law and fact hence required evidence.

(3.) After considering the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties it can be said that appellant has not been able to point out any infirmity in the impugned order. Admittedly, the appellant No.1 is a workman as defined under Section 2(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 (in short the Act). The question for consideration is whether the claim of the appellant for extension of two years service is based on the implementation, recognition and enforcing the term arising out of the settlement arrived at between the Management and the employees. If that be so then the question would arise whether the Civil Court can be called upon to enforce the same by declaring that term to be enforceable? Similarly, we have to consider can Civil Court by way of declaration allow specific performance of service contract. Admittedly, the case of the appellant is based on the interpretation of the terms of service settlements governing the service conditions. Once the claim of the appellant happens to be based on the basic condition arrived at by way of settlements then how the suit be maintainable. To understand whether Civil Court in such eventuality would have jurisdiction we have to analyse the provisions of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short CPC). The said provision in no uncertain terms lays down that Civil Courts have to have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which the congnizance is either expressely or impliedly barred. In order to find out whether in the facts of this case jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred expressly, for that we have to fall on the interpretation of the word "industrial dispute". If the relief sought in the suit is covered by the definition of "Industrial Dispute" then the jurisdiction of Civil Court is expressly barred. Section 2(k) of the Act defines "Industrial Dispute" as under:-