(1.) Professor Hakim Mohd. Mazhar-uddin Ajmali, a Professor of Diagnosis in the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College -and also Principal Jamia Tibbia, Delhi took on rent in the year 1940 a portion of the premises in a-double storeyed property bearing No. 7167-7169 situated at Beri Wala Bagh, Near Pul Bangash, Azad Market, Delhi-110006 from a family which migrated to Pakistan during the partition of the country. After the migration of this family, the property was declared as evacuee property and Professor Hakim Mohd. Mazhar-uddin Ajmali became a tenant under the custodian. Later on, this property was purchased by one Jeevan Dass from the Custodian of the evacuee property. Since the property was on two floors and there were two tenancies in respect of these two floors, Jeevan Dass instituted two suits for eviction against Professor Hakim Mohd. Mazharuddin Ajmali on the ground of sub-letting and also on the ground that he had acquired another accommodation for his residence. Though there were two suits for eviction the Additional Rent Controller by a consolidated order dated 4/3/1964 dismissed these suits finding that since the premises were being used by Professor Hakim Mohd. Mazhar-uddin Ajmali for a Dawakhana, the tenancy was for a composite purpose and, therefore. Section 14(1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was not available and though the premises were sub-let to the petitioner and his parents by Professor Hakim Mohd. Mazhar-uddin Ajmali and since the assignment had taken place prior to 1948 the ground of sub-letting was not available to the landlord.
(2.) In 1967 Jeevan Dass sold the property to Shri Panju Mal and Shri Vasdev sons of Shri Kuttu Mal. anju Mal issued rent receipts to the petitioner. In October 1972 Panju Mal and Vasdev sold the property to the <PG>133</PG> present respondents and gave vacant possession of the first floor to the respondents. On 14th October 1980 the respondents herein, instituted an eviction petition against the petitioner on the ground of bona fide personal requirement alleging that the premises in their possession were not sufficient for their family which consisted of the two respondents and their respective wives, a child of respondent No. 2 and a married daughter of respondent no. I and they being men of status, running hardware business, needed the premises in occupation of the petitioner for their own bona fide personal use. It was also urged that the wife of respondent no. I had developed a chronic sort of Asthama due to which she was unable to climb stairs and, therefore, she required the ground floor which was in possession of the petitioner. The petitioner sought leave to defend the suit inter alia alleging that Professor Hakim Mohd. Mazhar-uddin Ajmali continued to be the tenant though the rent receipts were issued in the name of the petitioner for the sake of convenience by the landlord. Secondly, the finding of the composite purpose in the previous suit filed by Jeevan Dass disentitled the respondents to file the suit and lastly the respondents did not need the premises for bona fide personal need as alleged. The Rent Controller granted leave to defend to the petitioner, however allowed the eviction petition filed by the respondents and held that : (1) the letting purpose of the premises was purely for residence; and (2) in view of the illness of the wife of respondent no. 2, respondents needed the premises for their bona fide personal use. It is this order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 22/4/1985 which has been challenged by the petitioner in this revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
(3.) In this Court though the main challenge was to the finding regarding letting purpose, learned counsel for the petitioner also disputed the bona fide need of the landlord. It was contended by the learned counsel that since in a previous litigation between Jeevan Dass and Prof. Hakim Mohd. Mazhar- uddin Ajmali, brother of the petitioner, it was held that the purpose of letting was composite, it was not open to the respondents to allege that the letting purpose was purely residential. He, therefore, relied on the judgment of the Additional Rent Controller in Jeevan Dass. v. Hakim Mohd. Mazhar-uddin Ajmali. It was further contended that purpose of letting has to be seen and not the user and thus even if it is found that because of the employment of the petitioner with Indian Airlines he was not using the said premises for commercial purpose, eviction on the ground of bona fide personal need could not be ordered.