LAWS(DLH)-1986-11-56

RENU CHAWLA Vs. STATE

Decided On November 06, 1986
RENU CHAWLA Appellant
V/S
STATE OF DELHI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This criminal revision filed by the revisionist Smt. Renu Chawla is directed against the order dated 30/1/1984 passed by Shri V.B. Bansal, Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, on the revision petition of Km. Manjul Kishore against the order dated 11/8/1983 of Shri Om Prakash, Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi. The learned Magistrate had summoned Km. Manjul in the complaint under Section 494 Indian Penal Code feeling satisfied that Anil Chawla another accused person in the case had contracted marriage with Km. Manjul second time during the subsistence of his first marriage with Smt. Renu Chawla. That order so far it pertains to the summoning of Km. Manjul was concerned was set aside by the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide his impugned order dated 30/1/1984 palpably on the ground that there was no evidence regarding the actual marriage through marriage rituals having taken place between Anil Chawla and Km. Manjul and that admission on the part of the accused was not sufficient to prove the aforesaid second marriage.

(2.) The contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist Smt. Renu Chawla is that at the stage of Section 204 Cr. P.C. for summoning of the accused persons the learned Magistrate may record a satisfaction on evidence which may not be sufficient at that point of time for convicting the accused persons and that in the case in hand it could be very well said that the admission of accused Anil Chawla contained in so many documents regarding his second marriage with Km. Manjul provided sufficient material for the Magistrate to order the summoning of Km. Manjul to face the trial under Section 493 Indian Penal Code. In Kanwal Ram and others v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 614 and in Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1153, it was unmistakably laid down that proof of solemnization of second marriage in accordance with essential religious rites applicable to parties is absolutely essential and a must for conviction for bigamy and that mere admission on the part of the accused that he had contracted second marriage was not enough and that such admission is not evidence for the purpose of proving marriage in an adultery or bigamy case. When that much is the rigour and the extend laid down by the Supreme Court for conviction in a case under Section 494 Indian Penal Code and the admission of an accused not sufficient for the purposes of proving the second marriage, the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist that even the admissions of the accused person Anil Chawla could be sufficient to enable the learned Magistrate to summon Km. Manjul as an accused person to face the trial, does not appear to be sound especially when, as stated in para No. 9 of the impugned order dated 30/1/1984 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, it was asked from the learned counsel for the revisionist Renu Chawla to point out any evidence to the effect that there was actual marriage between Manjul and Anil Kumar Chawla, he was not in a position to point out any such evidence and even on further inquiry if he would like to produce any such evidence by way of preliminary evidence before the summoning of Manjul, he made a clear statement at the bar that the revisionist did not want to produce any such evidence by way of preliminary evidence. The dividing line between the actual marriage by the performance of essential ceremonies governing the parties and the evidence in the form of admissions alone is so clear and unambiguous that any evidence whatever short of the evidence of performance of actual marriage by means of rituals could be of no use for the purposes of the case at any stage thereof and would not even be sufficient to enable the Magistrate for the purposes of summoning the accused person to face the trial, even though it may be that the evidence for enabling the Magistrate to summon the accused person may not be that rigorous as the one needed for the purpose of conviction. The position regarding the nature of evidence .in the particular case in hand appears to be somewhat clearly dealing it. Had there been some evidence, even though infirm, regarding the second marriage having been performed by rituals, it would be said that there was sufficient material before the Magistrate to summon the accused even though at that point of time the infirm evidence evidencing the performance of second marriage through rituals, taken by itself, may not be sufficient for recording conviction ultimately.

(3.) In this view of the matter I find no merit in this revision petition which is, therefore, dismissed. Lower court records be sent back immediately.