RAVI DUTT Vs. PHOOL WATI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By this petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner challenges the order of the Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi, upholding in appeal an order of the execution court overruling the objection of the petitioner with regard to the validity of the decree for the eviction of the tenant in respect of the premises pursuant to which the petitioner is sought to be evicted.

(2.) The proceedings have had a rather chequered course. Ram Saran Dass, since deceased, obtained a decree for the ejectment of his tenant, one Kabul Singh, in respect of the premises in dispute as early as the year 1955. Ejectment had been sought on the ground of non-payment of rent, nuisance and unauthorised sub-letting. Considerable evidence was led on behalf of the parties. Evidence was closed on November 29, 1954. On January 6, 1955, the court inspected the premises in dispute apparently with a view to verify the correctness of the rival contentions with regard to the conduct of the tenant which was alleged to constitute a nuisance. On February 10, 1955, however, the matter was compromised. The trial court recorded the statement of the tenant and of his counsel, inter alia, to the effect that the suit for ejectment be decreed but the decree would not be executable for a period of 26 months; that the tenant would not keep any sub-tenant during the period but that Ravi Dutt, the present petitioner, would not be considered a sub-tenant; and that if any subtenant was inducted the tenant would be liable to be dispossessed forthwith. A confirmatory statement was made by the landlord and his counsel. On this the court decreed the suit "in accordance with the statements of the parties and their counsel". The landlord has since died. The tenant vacated the premises, but the present petitioner, who was alleged in the suit to be the unauthorised subtenant, nevertheless continued to occupy the premises. When he was sought to be evicted in execution of the aforesaid decree he filed objections, inter alia, on the ground that he could not be evicted pursuant to the decree, because the decree, having been passed on the basis of a compromise and not on judicial satisfaction, was a nullity. and that the petitioner was entitled to challenge the decree at any stage by virtue of the fact that he was sought to be evicted from a premises which was in his lawful occupation in execution of it. The claim of the petitioner was resisted on behalf of the legal representatives of the landlord. The execution court overruled the objection of the petitioner holding, repelling the contention of the petitioner, that the decree had been validly passed by a court of competent jurisdiction inasmuch as the court had recorded the evidence of the partics and had inspected the spot and the satisfaction of the court as to the existence of statutory grounds for eviction could, therefore, be inferred, even though the decree purported to be based on a compromise. It was further held that there was a clear admission in the compromise which was incorporated in the decree, which admission would constitute a good ground for eviction. The order of the execution court has been upheld by the Additional Senior Sub-Judge, in his appellate order. The appellate court confirmed the conclusion of the execution court and repelled the contention that the decree was a nullity. The appellate court further held that even though the invalidity of a decree could be challenged at any stage the petitioner had no hens standi to assail the decree in dispute.

(3.) At the hearing of the petition in this Court a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that, inasmuch as the petitioner was neither a party to the proceedings, in which the decree was passed, nor did the petitioner claim any right or interest in the premises in dispute, either as a tenant or otherwise, and was a more trespasser, he had no locus standi to assail the validity of the decree and that the petition must, therefore) fail on that ground alone: It is not possible to accept this contention. It is true that the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings which culminated in the decree. It is equally true that the petitioner does not claim any right or interest in the premises in dispute save the limited right to remain in occupation unless evicted in accordance with law by a valid decree or order or process of a court. It is, however, well settled that a decree or an order of a court, which is a nullity, is incapable of conferring any rights and could not form basis of any process by a court of law. It is equally well settled that where a decree or an order is a nullity its invalidity can be challenged at any stage including the stage of execution and its invalidity can be set up at any time and anywhere as a defence to any action based on it. It is beyond doubt that no court would act on or in aid of a decree or an order which is a nullity, for a decree or order, which is a nullity, according to a fiction of law, has no legal existence. How can a court, therefore, act on the basis of or in aid of that which has no legal existence? Such a challenge to the validity of a decree has an impact on the very jurisdiction of the court. The petitioner has admittedly been residing in the premises in dispute since the time it was occupied by a bond fide tenant. At one stage he was alleged to be an unauthorised sub-tenant, a claim which was contested by the tenant. It was not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the landlord failed to establish the case of unauthorised sub-letting and the eventual decree passed was not and could not have been based on that allegation. The compromise of February 10, 1955 on the basis of which the decree was passed also envisages that the petitioner would not be treated as a sub-tenant for the purpose of depriving the tenant of the time allowed by the decree to vacate the premises. The petitioner is, therefore, a person who has been in occupation of the premises and can be evicted only in accordance with law. Where, therefore, the petitioner is sought to be evicted pursuant to a decree he would have the locus standi to assail its validity. What is more, Section 21 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act; 1952, under the provisions of which the decree was passed, provides that any decree passed under the Act will bind all persons who may be in occupation of the premises and possession thereof shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such persons there from. By virtue of the provisions of Section 21 of the Act the decree, therefore, becomes binding on all such persons except those who claim an independent title to the premises. If a decree binds a person either because that person was a party to the proceedings or because of a statutory provision like Section 23 of the Act, it obviously follows that such a person would have the necessary locus standi to assail the validity of that which is said to bind him. It would, therefore, be open to such a person to contend that he was bound only by a valid decree and that a decree which was a nullity in law was not only incapable of binding him but could not be made a basis to deprive him from the occupation of the premises in his possession. The wider net that the aforesaid provision casts for those in occupation itself provides the necessary foundation for the locus standi to assail the decree. The preliminary objections must, therefore, be overruled.