(1.) THESE are ten petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of Union of India. In all of them the parties are the same. So also are the essential facts and the questions to which they give rise. The only difference is that they pertain to different assessment years of purpose of income-tax. Respecting the question for determination that is of one significance, and consequently, I proceed to dispose of all of them by this common judgment.
(2.) MANY years ago there was a Hindu Joint Family (the 'assessee') which carried on business in watches under the name and style of Bal Kishan Dass and Sons at Chandni Chowk, Delhi. Ever since 1931-32 it was assessed to income tax and its assessment year was the same as the financial year. At the material time the Karta was Bal Kishan Dass. For the seven assessment years extending between 1st April 1941 to 31st March 1949, assessments were first made under the IT Act 1922 in the ordinary way. Afterwards, taking advantage of the voluntary and Quasi Voluntary Disclosure Scheme announced by the Government of India in May 1951, the assessee made disclosures in respective these assessment years. Therefrom, re-assessments were made for these years under s. 34 of the said Act by separate orders all dt. 31st Dec., 1951. Assessments for the years 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951-52 were made on 23rd March 1954, some date in February 1955 and 28th Feb., 1956 respectively. Thus, assessments for the ten years between 1st April 1941 and 31st March 1952 were finally completed, and that is how matters rested until the events to which I will now refer.
(3.) RULE 10 of the IT RULEs 1922 required that all sums deducted in accordance with provisions of s. 18, other than deductions by or on behalf of Government, should be paid within' one week from the date of such deduction'. Other eventualities contemplated by the rule are not relevant. Having failed to make deductions at source as and when commission was paid to Harparshad Bhatnagar, the assessee must, in the light of the rule, be 'deemed' to have been in default recurrently on the eight day after each such payment was made between 1st April, 1941 to 31st March, 1952. Applying the second mode of reckoning time prescribed by s. 231 of the new Act (the mode for an assesses 'deemed' to be in default), it is manifest that proceedings far recovery taken against the assessee in 1967 in respect of those defaults were hopelessly barred by time. It was not contended, and I do not think that it could possibly be contended that even though s. 231 itself provided a specific and different method of reckoning time in respect of an assessee 'deemed' to be in default, yet the general method provided by it, based on the making of a demand, could be applied to such a case. Such an argument would make the specific provision utterly futile.