MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Vs. BADRI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The principal question which arises for decision in these four civil revision petitions Nos. 408-D of 1960, 409-D of 1960, 421-D of 1963 and 422-D of 1963 is as to the interpretation of section 17 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Contral Act, 1952 (Act No. 38 of 1952-hereafter to be referred to as the Act.) The plaintiff in the four suits giving rise to these revision petitions was the Delhi Municipal Committee (now succeeded by the Delhi Municipal Corporation) and the defendants in each case were persons whom the plaintiff claimed to be its tenants. The defendants in the suits giving rise to revision petitions Nos. 408-D and 409-D of 1960 were respectively Badri and Murari Lal, who occupied different portions of a property situated in Mohalla Punjabi, Subzi Mandi, Delhi, and the plaintiff claimed that it required the premises for running a child welfare centre. The defendants in the suits giving rise to revision petitions Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1963 were respectively Mohammad Arab and Manzoor Elahi. who occupied different portions of premises No. 2414, Baradari Sher Afghan Khan, Bazar Ballimaran, Delhi, and the case of the plaintiff was that the premises were required for an object of public utility, viz., starting aschool. All the four suits were decreed by the trial Courts and eviction of the defendants ordered but the lower appellate Court, viz, Shri Udham Singh, Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, to whom the tenants Badri and Murari Lal had appealed, held that the Delhi Municipal Committee was not a public institution within the meaning of section 17 of the Act and was not, therefore, entitled to evict the defendants. Hence the appeals of Badri and Murari Lal were allowed and the suits of the Delhi Municipal Committee against them dismissed. In the other two cases, the lower appellate Court, viz., Shri G. R. Luthra, Additional Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, upheld the decision of the trial Court and held that the plaintiff as a public institution was en titled to take advantage of section 17 of the Act. In view of these conflicting decisions, the learned Single Judge, before whom these revision petitions came originally, directed that they be disposed of by a larger Bench. Section 17 of the Act is as follows :-

(2.) There can be no manner of doubt that the Delhi Municipal Committee under section 18 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (Punjab Act No. 3 of 1911), which was applied to the Delhi Municipal Committee also, was a body corporate. Similarly, by section 3 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Act No. 66 of 1957) the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was also a body corporate. Equally, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff was a 'local authority' as defined in clause (31) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act 10 of 1897). The plaintiff, there. fore came within the second and third categories as mentioned in the opening words of section 17 and it is not disputed that it could take advantage of section 17 if it required the premises for the use of its emplooees. If, however the plaintiff is to get advantage of clause (d) of section 17, viz., that the premises were bona fide required by it for the furtherance of its activities, it had in. addition to show that it was a public institution. According to Corpus Juris at pages 942 and 943 of the 32nd Volume, the term "institution" may embrace every person except private individuals or natural persons. The term is sometimes used as descriptive of the establishment or place where the business or operation of a society or association are carried on, at other times it is used to designate the organized body, and sometimes it is used in both of these senses. "Institution" may include not only its property, but also all of its legitimate activites that are consistent with, and in the furtherance of, the purposes for which it was organized. The plaintiff is obviously an institution in the sense that it is an organized body created by a statute. As stated in Corpus Juris, the term "public institution" connotes any organized activity created or established by law or public autority, and as distinguished from a "Private institution" carries with it used in its ordinary and well understood meaning, at least prima facie the idea of some public service or use which it is designed to set up. The learned counsel for the defendants did not, in fact, content that the plaintiff, with its wide spread public functions, was not a public institution in ordinary paralance. What was strongly urged on behalf of the defendants was that as the plaintiff fell into two of the preceding categories, viz., "body corporate' and local authority, it must, on the principles of interpretation of statutes, be excluded from the ambit of the term "public institution" where that term was first used in section 17, and, in that event, the same term viz., "public institution" -where it is used for the second time must be presumed to have the same meaning, that is, excluding local authority' or body corporate'. As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes at pages 311 and 312 of the Eleventh Edition, it is reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act.

(3.) For the purpose of this argument, however, we have first to see whether it is possible to restrict, in the sense urged on behalf of the defendants, the term "public institution" where it is first used in the section. Reliance in this connection is placed on certain observations in Maxwell at page 320. It is stated there that when two words or expressions are copied together, one of which generally includes the other, it is obvious that the more general term is used in a meaning excluding the specific one. It was, therefore, argued that the public institutions, which can take anvantage of clause (d) of section 17, cannot be those which fall within the previous three categories, viz., "company body corporate, or local authority". Inother words, the term ''public institution" is to be read disjunctively with the other three categories, which precede the use of that term in the section. By way of illustration of this principle learned counsel for the defendants cited Thursby v. Churchwardens & Co., of Briercliffe with Extwistle. The point in that appeal was whether under the lighting and watching Act (3 & 4 Wm. 4c.90) section 38, a coal mint is to be rated at the higher rate provided for by that section or at the lower rate. The section provides "that owners and occupiers of houses, buildings, and property (other than land) rateable to the relief of the poor in any such parish shall be rated at and pay a rate in the pound three times greater than that at which the owners aud occupiers of land shall be rated at and pay for the purposes of this Act." The contention of the appellants was that a coal mine was land, and therefore, falls to be rated at the lower rate. The contention of the respondents, which had been given effect to by the Court below, was that a coal mine was not land within the meaning of that provision, and therefore was to be rated at the higher rate. In considering this question assistance was derived from the use of the term "land" in the Poor Relief Act, 1601 (c.2) because the earlier part of the section had laid down that the overseers "shall proceed in the same manner" as for levying money for the relief of the poor". Now the Poor Relief Act, 1601 (c.2), section I imposed a poor rate on the occupiers of "lands", houses, tithes and "coal mines". A question was raised whether mines other than coal mines were rateable and it was held that they were not, on account of the specific mention of coal mines as a subject of rating, even though the word "lands" was large enough to cover all mines. It was in this context that in the case cited it was held that the category of "lands" would not include coal mines and hence such mines would be assessable at the higher rate. Learned counsel for the defendants also relied on another illustration as given in Maxwell, which is as follows :-