(1.) A double-storeyed house on Original Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, belongs to Kamla Soni respondent. The first floor of the house is let to Roop Lal appellant. The landlady applied for the tenant's eviction from the first floor on the ground that she bonafide required it for occupation as a residence for herself and that she had "no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation." It appears that at the same time by a separate application, the landlady had asked for the eviction of another tenant who was in occupation of the ground-floor of the house and that portion was vacated by that tenant and became available for occupation by the landlady. The respondent did not go into the occupation of that portion and in support of her claim for eviction said that she actually needed the whole of the house, as she and her family had decided to shift to Delhi from Ambala and they were not used to live in any house in which another person or another tenant may be living. This allegation was made in answer to the obvious suggestion forthcoming in defence that the respondent was in a position to occupy the groundfloor vacated by the other tenant and that that flat was sufficient for the respondent's needs. It also appears that the ground-floor flat rendered available to the landlady consists of four bedrooms, one drawing room, one dining room and one office room, apart from a number of verandahs. The landlady's family consists only of herself, her husband and one adopted daughter. The Addl. Rent Controller was faced with two questions: (1) whether the respondent really required the first floor for her own residence? And, (2) whether the accommodation available to the respondent in the ground-floor flat was not reasonably suitable for her needs? Both those questions were answered by the Additional Rent Controller in favour of the landlady and an order of eviction was passed. The appellant in this Court took an appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal, but did not succeed there. The Rent Control Tribunal had recourse to a number of decisions bearing on the question whether the requirements of a particular landlord were to be left subjectively to his own state of mind or whether the question of accommodation actually in possession of the landlord being 'reasonably suitable' was to be judged objectively and in the context of physical sufficiency of the accommodation, and consequently the physical sufficiency of the accommodation alone was to be considered or also the surrounding circumstances relevant to the question of suitability? The Tribunal seems to have adopted the view, and primarily on the basis of certain decisions of this Court, that in determining the issue the dominant fact must be the state of landlord's mind and even on the question of suitability of accommodation in his possession, the suitability or non suitability must be judged with reference to his state of mind. I will advert to the various decisions relied on by the Tribunal a little later, but it would be relevant to quote here the finding arrived at by the Tribunal. It is,-"Taking into consideration the status of the family and the fact that they are not accustomed to live in a house, part of which is occupied by any other person, and the likelihood of the interference in the privacy by the occupation of the first floor by the appellant, I agree with the findings of the Additional Controller that the existing accommodation in possession of the landlady is not reasonably suitable within the meaning of clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act." The Tribunal also held that,-
(2.) The appeal came for hearing before Dulat, J. who felt that in view of the importance of the question raised, the matter should be considered by a larger Bench. This is how the appeal has come for disposal before us.
(3.) I would now proceed to eximine various decisions having a bearing on the question. In Sant Ram Des Raj v. Karam Chand, a Full Bench of this court considered the scope of section 13 (3) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (III of 1949). The relevant part of section 13 is as under:-