INDRA PERFUMERY COMPANY Vs. MOTI IAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal was settled by (Grover, J. by his order dated 7th of February, 1966, on the basis that the same had become infructuous, the application for eviction having been dissmissed. That order was passed by Grover, J. at the instance of the respondents without notice to the appellants and without hearing them. In this situation, an application was filed for setting aside of the order of Grover, J. This application is not objected to by the learned counsel for the respondents. I would accordingly vacate the order of Grover, J., and restore the appeal for hearing.

(2.) This second appeal is directed against the decision of the Rent Control Tribunal upholding the decision of the Rent Controller under section 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This case has an interesting history. The premises in dispute form part of a- larger building belonging to one Mohd Shafi. The building is situate. in Gandhi Market. The dispute relates to a part of the building denoted by No. 9830. This part of the building was rented out by Mohd. Shafi to the present respondents, Moti Lal and another, on the 6th of April, 1954. The argreed rent was Rs. 436.00 per mensem. On the 3rd of November, 1956. a part of the rented premises was rented out by the respondents to the appellants Massrs Indra Perfumery Company. There are three partners of this company, namely, Nanak Chand and others. The rent argeed to being Rs. 115.00 per mensem. The appellant-company did not pay the agreed rent of tenanted premises to the respondents, with the result that the respondents filed an application under section 14 for eviction of the appellants for non-payment of rent. This application was contested by the appellants on the plea that they had become owners of the tenanted premises by reason of the purchase and therefore, the tenancy had come to an and this contention was contrrverted by the respondents. The Rent Controller rejected the appellants's contention and passed an order under section 15 (1) of the Act. An appeal by the appellants to the Rent Control Tribunal met with no success. It is in this situation that the present second appeal has been preferred.

(3.) It is no doubt true that a question of law does arise, but I am extremely doubtful if that question of law is a substantial question of law. Any how, I have thought it fit to determine the question of law raised by tlie learned counsel for the appellants. His contention is that by reason of the application of the doctrine of merger, the tenancy in his favour has merged into the higher right, which be has acquired by purchase, namely) the ownership right. It is a fundamental principle of law that a lesser estate merges in a larger estate' provided these is no intervening estate between the two. The learned counsel's contention is that the tenancy by the previous owner in favour of the respondents is not an intervening estate so far as the appellants are concerned. In my opinion, this contention is not sound. Vis-a-vis the appellants, the respondents are the landlords. The transfer by the previous owner to the appellants does not wipe out the tenancy in favour of the respondents. I can see no reason how one single indivisible tenancy can be partly wiped out. If I were to give effect to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, I Would be in a way, wiping out a part of the indivisible tenancy, a result which cannot be countenanced in law. After giving my careful consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel I see no reason to interfere with the decision of the courts below.