RAMLABHAYA Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ThisLetters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment of learned Single Jude dated the 6th of March 1964 whereby he dismissed the appellant's writ petition (Civil Writ No. 503-D of 1958) which was under article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(2.) The facts relevant to the decision of the Letters Patent Appeal are not in dispute. The appellant as well as Ram Lal (respodent No. 5)- who is the only contesting respondent to this appeal as well as to the writ petition (hereinafter to be refrred is as the respondent) were allottees of house No.XII/2151 in Subzimandi, Delhi. This house was allotable property and was valued at Rs. 5,963.00 by the Rehabilitation Department. The dispute beetween the parties relates to the question as to which of them is eligible for the transfer of this property under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (Act 44 of 1954) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) and the rules thereunder, and the authorities have come to varying decisions from time to time. The question has to be determined with reference to rule 30 of the Rules made under the Act and this rule originally provided that "if more persons then one holding verified claims are in occupation of any acquired evacuee property, which is an allotable property, the property shall be offered to the person whose net compensation is nearest to the value of the property and other persons may be alloted such other acquired evacuee property which is allotable as may be avaiable.''The petitioner as well to as the respondent held verified claims, the compensation payable to the former being Rs 1.770.00 and to the latter Rs. 1,380.00. It may be mentioned here that the petitioner's wife also had a verified claim and compensation payable to her amounted to Rs. 1,032.00. When the rival claims were adjudicated upon by the Managing Officer appointed under the Act, he found that arrears of rent of the property outstanding against the petitioner came to Rs. 554.69 Naye Paise, while there were no such arrears outstanding against the respondent. The Managing Officer deducted the amount of arrears from the amount of compensation to which the petitioner was entitled and then held that the net compensation due to the respondent was nearer to the reserve price of the property. Therefore, by his order dated the 12th of February 1958 (copy annexure 'E' to the writ petition), he declared that the respondent was eligible for purchasing. the property. Subsequent to the date .of this order, an amendment of rule 30 came into force with effect from the 20th of February, 1958, according to which the eligility of the rival claimants was to be determined with reference not to the net compensation but to the gross compensation. The applicant's appeal against the Managing Officer's order was heard by the Additional Settlement Commissioner who, by his order dated the 15th of April, 1958 (copy annexure 'D' to the writ petition held that the aforesaid amendment was not meant to have retrospective effect and could, therefore, not help the appellant. A further point was urged before the Additional Settlement Commsssioner, viz., the question of assmilating the petitioner's wife's compensation to determine his eligibility, but the Additional Settlement Commisioner was not prepared to consider this point as it had been not raised by the appellant before the Managing Officer. The Additional Settlement Commissioner, therefore, dissmissed the appeal.

(3.) The appellant then went up, by way of revision to the Chief Settlement Commissioner. In the Grounds of Revision, a copy of which has been filed by the appellant, both points were taken, viz., first, that the amendment of rule 30 should be given retrospective effect and secondly that compensation due to the appellant's wife should have been clubbed together with a view to adjudicating the question of eligibility under rule 30. The Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner in his order dated the 11th of Augnst 1958 (copy annexure 'B' to the writ petition) found the second point in favour of the appellant and, quashing the orders of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and the Managing Officer, he declared the appellant to be the person eligible for the transfer of the property.