(1.) This appeal against an order of maintenance pendente lite is premised on the narrow ground that with cessation of the impugned matrimonial proceedings - in this case under Sec. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights, a maintenance order could not have been made. Learned counsel relies upon Chitra Lekha Vs. Ranjit Rai AIR 1977 Delhi 176 , in support of his contention. We notice that the said decision was rendered by a learned Single Judge. A contrary view was adopted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amrik Singh Vs. Smt. Narinder Kaur AIR 1979 P & H 211 and Sohan Lal Vs. Kamlesh AIR 1984 P &H 332 and the Mysore High Court in N. Subramanyam Vs. M.G. Saraswathi AIR 1964 Mysore 38 . The judgment in Sohan Lal (supra) in fact notices the judgment cited by the appellant, i.e. Chitra Lekha (supra) and holds as follows:
(2.) As is evident, the view taken in Chitra Lekha (supra) was favoured in Sudershan Kumar Khurana Vs. Deepak AIR 1981 P &H 305 . The Division Bench in Sohan Lal (supra), for reasons which we entirely concur with, overruled the reasoning which is the underlying basis for Chitra Lekha (supra).
(3.) This Court is also of the opinion that if the reasoning in Chitra Lekha (supra) is allowed to stand, unanticipated hardship could ensue frequently to those moving the Court under Sec. 24. For instance, in the event a substantive claim for matrimonial relief is made by the husband and the wife’s application under Sec. 24 is pending for an unduly long period, of say one or two years, the exercise of choice by the husband to withdraw the petition for reasons best known to him - and the application of the rule that no maintenance would be granted even for the limited duration, would cause untold hardship. Situations could well arise where in such event, husband, for tactical reasons, withdraws the substantive proceeding despite knowledge that his wife is deprived of sources of income or livelihood.