STATE OF DELHI Vs. VIJENDRA SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) State's application for leave to appeal against acquittal dated 27/3/2001 in S.C.No. 258/1996; FIR 71/1988 for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC was presented on 28/8/2001. The same was returned by the Registry which required a copy of the impugned order. After removing the objection, the application for leave to appeal was filed on 24.9.2001. The present Crl.M.A.No. 1025/2002 for condoning the delay in presentation of the application for leave is presented on 7.3.2002. The application is opposed on behalf of the respondents.

(2.) Two questions are involved in this application for condonation of delay. The first is whether sufficient ground for condonation of delay has been made out and, secondly, whether the application for condonation of delay, which itself is delayed for not having been filed along with the application for leave to appeal, can be entertained. Let us take the first question first. The facts explaining the delay are as under: The APP submitted his opinion on the impugned judgment on 27.3.2001 and thereafter the PP agreeing with the view of the APP forwarded the file to the Director of Prosecution on 1.5.2001. The Director of Prosecution agreeing with the views of APP and PP forwarded the file then to the Secretary (L&J) on 14.5.2001. The Secretary on his part examined the matter and then forwarded the file to the Competent Authority namely the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi through the Chief Secretary and Chief Minister of Delhi. The file was returned to the Director of Prosecution with the approval of the Competent Authority on 13.6.2001. The Director of Prosecution sent the file to the SDM, Saraswati Vihar, who forwarded the same to the office of the standing counsel on 9.7.2001. The appeal was prepared and filed on 28.8.2001. By then, the appeal was already delayed by 62 days.

(3.) In reply it is contended that no sufficient ground for condonation of delay is made out in the application inasmuch as there is no explanation as to why it took so long for the matter to be considered at every stage. Whether the procedure involved in filing an appeal against acquittal as detailed above could give a ground for condonation of delay has been considered by this Court in a very recent judgment in the case of State v. Suresh Kumar, Crl.M.Nos.1624/02 & 57/04 in Crl.L.P.52/2002 and certain other cases disposed of by a common judgment. This judgment delivered on 15.10.2004 was on the point as to whether delay in preferring an appeal could be condoned. This Court then noted the procedure involved as described above and taking into consideration Supreme Court's judgments in the cases of Shankuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 575; New India Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237; State of Kerala v. E.K.Kuriyipe & Ors., 1981 (Supp.) SCC 72; O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh & Ors., (1984) 4 SCC 66; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC107; G.Ramegowda, Major & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bengalore (1988) 2 SCC 142; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 132; Bikram Dass v. Financial Commissioner & Ors.,.; and Indian Statistical Institute v. M/s Associated Builders and Ors., AIR 78 SC 335, condoned the delay in presenting appeals before it. The delay under consideration in those matters ranged between 66 days to 450 days. In all those matters the delay in refiling the papers varied between 174 days to 1015 days. The Court began with the observation that 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to avoid mis-carriage of justice arid to do substantial justice and proceeded to observe that while the law of limitation was the same for a private citizen as for Government authorities yet somewhat different considerations arise when a request for condonation is made by/or on behalf of the Government and that factors which are peculiar and characteristie for functioning of the Government would call for a certain amount of latitude. A pragmatic and justice-oriented approach was found to be the right way for examining such requests. The refreshing departure from the beaten track is justified in that judgment by considerations of public interest, which the Court observed cannot suffer because of indolence, inaction or negligence of any official in the Government regardless of whether the same arises out of a bona fide error of judgment, lethargy or corrupt motives. It was observed that dismissal of a cause otherwise than on merits may, in certain situations, amount to playing in the hands of such elements as are either disinterested in protecting public interest or deliberately work against the same by avoiding to take a decision where the same ought to be taken quickly.