(1.) Normally, the Courts are loathe in interfering with Policies devised by the Government unless it is wholly reasonable in the Wednesbury sense and/or it violates the equality principles set down in Article 14 of the Constitution or any fundamental rights. In Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) vs. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333 it has been held that -- 45. In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India there was a challenge to the validity of the establishment of a large dam. It was held by the majority at p. 762 as follows : (SCC para 229)
(2.) In State of Orissa v. Gopinath Dash, JT 2005 (10) 484 it has been opined that -- 8. The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can adopt which policy should be adopted after considering all the points from different angles. In matter of policy decision or exercise of discretion by the Government so long as the infringement of fundamental right is not shown courts will have no occasion to interfere and the court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such mattes. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the Government the court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government.
(3.) In the present case, the Policy specifies that in order to be eligible to import rough marble, the prospective allottee must have set up a manufacturing/processing unit and further should have imported rough marble in the SIL(Specific Import Licence) List. The Petitioner does not fall in either of these categories. On the contrary, it has been disclosed that the Petitioner has defaulted on Export Obligations in the previous years. He has been placed in a Denied Entity List as a consequence of which he would not be entitled to apply under the new policy. In the course of arguments, it has been contended that previously the Petitioner used to purchase marble from EOUs. Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, learned Additional Solicitor General, clarifies that this was not permissible under the earlier policy, inter alia, for the reason that all licences were subject to actual user conditions. In these circumstances, if the Petitioner had been acquiring in an irregular manner, it cannot expect to perpetuate this practice through Court intervention.