AIZAZ ALAM Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) All these review petitions, arise out of a common judgment and order passed by this Court in a batch of cases, challenging acquisition of land, owned by the petitioners for a public purpose. Messrs P.N. Lekhi and Ravinder Sethi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners have, in the course of their extensive argument before us, urged that the judgment under review suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record in as much as this Court had not considered the following questions that fell for consideration in addition to the two questions that were formulated and answered by us: (i) That no public purpose existed for the acquisition in question nor was there any material to support any such purpose; (ii) That the total area required for "Anjuman Sher-E-Gul Faroshan" was limited to around 4000 sq.yds whereas the respondent had notified a much larger area measuring 72 bighas. There was, according to learned counsel, no requirement for such an extensive acquisition unrelated to any other purpose - public or otherwise; (iii) The judgment delivered by this Court in the previous round of litigation was legally unsustainable in as much as a common notification having been issued under Section 4 and 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Court was not justified in quashing the notification in part to the extent it was under Section 17(4) and upholding the part that was referable to Section 4 of the Act; (iv) The Delhi Development Authority had proposed de-notification of the area under acquisition on the ground that it had no scheme for its development. In the absence of a scheme, the proposed acquisition was bad; (v) The interpretation placed by this Court upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Padma Sunder Rao Vs. Union of India, (2002) 3 SCC 533 was erroneous. The Court had overlooked the fact that if the interpretation which it had accepted was the true interpretation, then the owners of the land being acquired, would be deprived of interest during the extended period; and (vi) That Badar Durrez Ahmed, J. who was a member of the Bench hearing the batch of cases ought to have recused himself from the hearing as he had done so when the present review petition had come up before his Lordship.

(2.) Reliance was in support of the above submissions, placed by the learned counsel upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453; State Bank of India Vs. Samarendra Kishore Endow and Anr., (1994) 2 SCC 537; Ambala D.Bhatt Vs. State of Gujarat, (1972) 3 SCC 525; Gardner Vs. Marsh and Parsons. (1997) 3 ALL ER 871; County Ltd. Vs. Girozentrale Securities, (1996) 3 ALL ER 834; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14; BCCI Vs. Netaji Cricekt Club, (2005) 4 SCC 741 and M.M. B. Catholicos Vs. M.P. Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526.

(3.) On behalf of the respondents, it was, on the other hand, argued by Ms.Geeta Luthra that the points which the petitioners are now urging, had never been urged at the time of hearing of the petitions in which only two issues were formulated and argued by counsel for the petitioners. The issues now sought to be raised having been abandoned by the petitioners, there was no question of testing the correctness of the judgment of this Court by reference to the same. She argued on the authority of the decisions of the Supreme Court that a review petition was not meant to be a re-hearing of the case but had to be confined to finding out whether the judgment under review suffered from any error apparent on the face of the record. Even in cases where a second view was possible, the Court that has taken one of the two possible views, cannot be called upon to review the order just because another view was also logically possible. The power of review, argued the learned counsel, was available only for correcting a mistake. It could not be invoked to substitute the view taken by the Court by another view as was being proposed by the petitioners. She also refered to the order of this Court passed in review application No.266 of 2005, disposed of on 21st September, 2005 and urged that this Court having already rejected a similar review petition, there was no room for taking a different view in the present batch of petitions.