STATE CBI Vs. RANJEET SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This reference arises out of a communication No.52254 dated 9.12.1999 sent by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi requesting for grant of sanction of this Court under Section 308 Cr.P.C. for trial of accused Ranjeet Singh for the offence under Section 193 IPC in case State (CBI) Vs. Ranjeet Singh, Sessions Case No.745/96, R.C.No.17(S)/93/SPL.CBI Distt. Delhi.

(2.) The relevant facts giving rise to the reference are that a case R.C.No. 17(S)/93/SPL.CBI/93-Delhi was registered with the Special Crime Branch, New Delhi on 16.9.1993 pursuant to directions issued by this Court on 1.9.1993 in WP(Crl.)304/1993 and investigation of case FIR 226/1993 under Section 365 IPC, police station Vinay Nagar was taken over by the CBI. During the course of investigation one of the accused-Ranjeet Singh was arrested on 20.4.1994 from Village Satora Pehwa, Distt.Kurukshetra, Haryana and after expiry of his police remand he was remanded to judicial custody on 30.4.1994. After some time, accused Ranjeet Singh expressed his desire to make a confession of the crime committed by him and others and submitted an application to the court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate which was made over to another Metropolitan Magistrate who recorded the statement of the accused-Ranjeet Singh, on 28.5.1994. In the said statement, Ranjeet Singh made certain inculpatory statement in relation to the incident and thereupon he was granted pardon by the competent court under the provisions of Section 307 Cr.P.C. After investigation, the CBI filed charge-sheet against eight accused persons; namely Kehar Singh, Smt.Balwinder Kaur, Mr.Dilber Singh, Mr.Pradeep Kumar, Mr.Ranjeet Singh, Mr.Inder Kumar Makhija, Mr.Rulda Singh, Smt.Kiran Kapoor, Mr.Radhey Shyam Gulshan and Mr.Sharat Makhija, for the offence punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 364/368/201/302/216/342/344/347/348-IPC. They were tried by the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi but during the course of trial, Ranjit Singh, who had earlier made a confessional and inculpatory statement took a somersault totally disowning his earlier statement on the basis of which he was granted pardon. However, before conclusion of the trial the court felt that the approver Ranjit Singh should be prosecuted for the offence of perjury under Section 193 IPC and after affording due opportunities and hearing him, vide an order dated 2.12.1999 held that it was a fit case where the said approver Ranjit Singh should be prosecuted on the charge of perjury. As the trial of the said approver for the said offence of perjury required a sanction within the meaning of second proviso of Section 308(1) Cr.P.C. the learned Additional Sessions Judge made the present reference.

(3.) I have heard Mr.R.M.Tiwari, learned counsel representing the State (CBI) and Mr.K.K.Manan, learned counsel representing the respondent. Mr.Manan, learned counsel representing Ranjit Singh raised an objection in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court which was required to be exercised within the meaning of the said proviso viz. whether the grant of sanction or otherwise is an administrative or judicial act of the High Court. On the other hand, Mr.Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner has on the strength of a Gujarat High Court decision in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Ramasi Devasi Bhil alias Chakala, 1991 Crl.L.J.2801, has urged that having regard to the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and more particularly Chapter XXIV, the sanction envisaged by the second proviso of Section 308(1) Cr.P.C. has to be necessarily on judicial side and not on administrative. Although the said judgment does not address this question, but having regard to the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the entire investigation, prosecution and trial of the accused persons in this case is governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the pardon to the approver was granted under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure and it is proposed to try the said approver for the offence of perjury in terms of the provisions of Section 308(1), this Court has no hesitation in holding that the jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under the second proviso of Section 308(1) Cr.P.C. is necessarily a jurisdiction on judicial side. Therefore, I see no force in the objection of the learned counsel for the respondent.