HANS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY Vs. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The award in this case was made on 06.12.1999. Under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 a notice is required to be given to the parties with regard to the filing of the award in the court. After the making of the award, the same was filed in court and a notice was issued by this court in the usual manner in which such notices go. A copy of that notice is annexed as Annexure-A-1 filed with the objections filed by the respondent/objector. It is an admitted position that the notice which was sent by this court was served on the respondent / objector on 21.02.2000. The notice was addressed to the very same person who was a party in the arbitration proceedings which culminated in the impugned award. The objections, however, have been filed on 20.04.2000. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the objections cannot be looked into as the same are beyond time, i.e., beyond the period of 30 days prescribed under Article 119 (b) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The said article reads as under:- Description of appeal Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 119. Under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940),?

(2.) It is apparent from a reading of the said provision that the starting point of limitation is the date of service of notice of the filing of the award. Admittedly, the notice was served on 21.02.2000 and, therefore, it becomes clear that 30 days had expired prior to the filing of the objections on 20.04.2000. The learned counsel for the respondent / objector had submitted that the notice as served on 21.02.2000 bore the subject CS(OS) 52-A/2000 and the name of the plaintiff and the defendant. It also indicated the next date of hearing as 09.05.2000. Therefore, the respondent / objector was not aware as to whether it was notice of a suit or in respect of an award. However, I am not inclined to accept this contention inasmuch as the number borne on the notice was the usual alpha numeric number issued by this court?52A/2000 and the letter 'A' was being assigned by this court for matters pertaining to arbitrations. Secondly, the notice was sent to the very person who was a party to the arbitration proceedings. It is also to be noted that prior to a notice is sent by the court under Section 14 (2), the arbitrator is also required to send a notice of the making of the award under Section 14 (1). According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Arbitrator himself had sent such a notice on 16.12.1999 of the making of the award to the parties and the very same person to whom the notice was sent by the court was the noticee. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the contention raised by the respondent that it was unable to discern as to whether it was a suit or an arbitration matter and that the award had been filed in this court, is not tenable.

(3.) It is lastly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the starting point of limitation should be taken from the date of knowledge. The date of knowledge, according to the learned counsel for the respondent / objector was 13.04.2000 when the judicial file was inspected in this court and it was at that point of time that they came to know that the award has been made and filed in the court. Unfortunately, I am unable to agree with this proposition in view of the express provision of the Limitation Act which says that the point when limitation will start running will be from the date of service of notice. The date of service of notice is admittedly 21.02.2000 and, therefore, the clock starts then.