ASOKE GHOSH Vs. URMI A GOSWAMI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By these Orders I shall dispose of the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which accompanied the filing of the Plaint. The prayers in the Plaint pertain to the passing of a permanent injunction and the grant of damages amounting to Rs. one crore. Copious and lengthy arguments have been filed with photocopies of decisions from across the globe. Counsel have made their submissions within the parameters of the decision of the Division Bench in Khushwant Singh v. Maneka Gandhi, AIR 2002 Delhi 58, which holds that an injunction should not be granted at the pre-publication stage. However, it does not inexorably or logically follow that an injunction cannot be granted post-publication. The Division Bench was only concerned with an injunction at the pre-publication stage; yet it specifically took note of prior publications which had been made in respect of some of the defamatory statements which the plaintiff had prayed to be injuncted. This is for the reason that the preponderant view in India as well as in other judicial systems is that once an allegedly defamatory statement has become common knowledge or has fallen within the public domain it is damages and not injunction that would be the appropriate relief. The Division Bench also specifically discussed the aspect of the defendant stating that it would justify the comments made in the Article. Learned Counsel for the defendant has categorically stated that the defendant intends to justify every statement made in the Article.

(2.) Briefly stated, it prima facie appears to me that if injunctions cannot be granted at the pre-publication stage, and that if they should not be granted once information is in the public domain, the jural approach should be that an injunction ought not to be granted at all. This is all the more so where the plaintiff claims damages, as in the present case. The emphasis on ascertaining from the defendant whether it intends to justify the alleged defamatory comments is salutary in that it would not be open to the defendant, after defamation has already been carried out, to tender an apology or to say that it was misinformed.

(3.) Reference has been made to the pleadings in the written statement where the defendant has relied on litigation pending in this Court. Learned Counsel for the defendant laid great store on the payment by the plaintiff of certain amounts at the initial stages of the litigation. Mr. Chitale has quickly pointed out that these amounts were paid without prejudice to the contention of the plaintiff in those proceedings. Had the defendant relied purely on those events, since they had transpired after the writing and publishing of the Article, they would have been clearly anachronistic. It would, therefore, not have been open to the defendant to rely on those events. Learned Counsel for the defendant, however, submits that the author already had sufficient and independent material on the basis of which the article was written. Therefore, the litigation was only an additional justification forthe alleged defamatory writing. It is clear that the defendant intends to prove the veracity of the publication.