SAMRAT BEHL Vs. GOVT OF NCT DELHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant feeling aggrieved with the order of the learned Single Judge dated 28.8.2006 [W.P.(C) 13539/2006] has filed the present writ appeal. After decision of the Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, V (2006) SLT 713=2006 VI AD (SC) 213, the controversy relating to the grant of L-52 licences to private parties pursuant to pelicy of the Government to partially privatize retail sale of liquor stands settled. The facts of the present case are fully covered by the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court. The appellant has tried to distinguish his case by stating that the L-52 licence was already granted to him prior to 9.3.2005 though the same was actually issued on 26.4.2005. Mr. Arun Jaitley, learned Senior Advocate appearing forthe appellant forcefully pleaded that the date of grant of permit is the date of the order and the issuance of permit is a mere ministerial function and on this plea he states that the licence to the appellant was approved on 14.2.2005 and, therefore, this date would be relevant for deciding the case of the appellant and not the date of actual grant of licence which was 26.4.2005. We have given our anxious consideration to the said argument raised by the learned Senior Advocate and we do not find any force in the same. The learned Single Judge has considered and discussed these pleas of the appellant in the impugned order and we concur with the same. The learned Single Judge has held that pursuant to the approval granted on 14.2.2005, the issuance of licence in favour of the appellant was dependant on fulfilment of various terms and conditions and, therefore, compliance of these terms and conditions cannot be construed as a mere ministerial act on the part of the executive and, therefore, the date of grant of licence in favour of the appellant cannot be taken to be any other date except 26.4.2005. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharif Ahmed v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1978 SC 209, being relied upon by the appellant has been distinguished by the learned Single Judge after taking into account the facts of the present case.

(2.) The learned Senior Advocate has also contended that in the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has wrongly stated about mentioning of the date of 9.3.2005 by the learned Additional Solicitor General while no such date is reflected in the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Here, also, we do not subscribe to this argument of the learned Senior Advocate as although in the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the date of 9.3.2005 is not mentioned at a place where it refers to the statement of the learned Additional Solicitor General, Government of India but after examining the entire judgment, it is clear that the steps for cancellation were to be taken by the Government in respect of those licences which were issued after 9.3.2005. The relevance of date of 9.3.2005 is that from this date alone, the Government has kept the policy of issuing L-52 licences to private parties in abeyance, and, therefore, any licence which was issued after 9.3.2005 was ipso facto illegal. Ultimately the decision of Government dated 9.3.2005 culminated into laying down a policy vide policy dated 16.9.2005, pursuant to which the Government had ultimately, decided not to issue any L-52 policy to private persons. This very policy came under challenge before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and thereafter the matter went to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (supra). It may not be correct to say that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has not taken note of those licences which were issued by the Government after 9th March, 2005. On the contrary, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the said decision has expressed its dissatisfaction as regards the manner in which the Government had dealt with some cases even after the policy to issue L-52 licences was kept in abeyance from 9.3.2005. The following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would be relevant to meet the argument of the appellant:

(3.) Even in the order passed by the Collector (Excise) which is at pages 103 to 111 of the paper book, it is clearly held that had the case of the appellant been kept in abeyance pursuant to the decision of the Government dated 9.3.2005, the application of the appellant would have been rejected pursuant to the final policy decision taken by the Government on 16:9.2005. It would be worthwhile to reproduce following para from the said order of the Collector (Excise):