KRIPA RAM Vs. RAMESH CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision petition is directed against the judgment dated February 4, 1984, passed by the court of Shri T.D.Kashav, Sub Judge, Ist Class, Delhi. The learned judge disposed of an objection raised by the respondent/defendant regarding exhibiting a document dated April 4, 1977 which was filed as an agreement of contract with the list of documents by the petitioner/plaintiff on December 24, 1980. The appellant had given property No. 5307 fitted with flour mill with all its accessories including scales and weights etc. situated at Shora Kothi, Pahar Ganj, New Delhi, to the respondent/tenant Ramesh Chand with a condition that Ramesh Chand will pay a sum of Rs.300.00 per month and will also pay electricity charges directly to the authorities, by virtue of the Agreement as referred to above. The respondent was also to be responsible for all kinds of repair of the flour mill and its engine etc. The contract between the parties, it is alleged, was valid for a period of one year i.e. from April 1, 1977 to March 31, 1978 and it was agreed that the owner was the licence-holder yet the licence fee shall be paid by the respondent/defendant on behalf of the owner and the respondent shall abide and comply with all the rules and regulations in this regard.

(2.) The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit in the trial court for recovery of Rs.11,400.00 and for ejectment of the respondent. It is stated in the plaint that the respondent had paid hire money upto September 30, 1977 and has not paid hier money from October 1, 1977 to March 31, 1978. The hiring contract came to an end by efflux of time on March 31, 1978 and otherwise also notice dated March 22, 1978 was given to the respondent intimating that the hiring contract came to an end on March 31, 1978 and respondent was called upon to hand over the flour mill in working condition together with Scales and Weights and Electric motor etc. on the expiry of hiring contract and seize to occupy the premises where the mill was fixed. The suit is pending trial before the trial court and in the present petition this Court is only concerned with the short question, as to whether, the document dated April 4, 1977 required compulsory registration under Section 107 of the Transport of Property Act and the same having not been registered whether it could be exhibited and was admissible in evidence. The respondent contended before the trial court that the document was an instrument of lease of immovable property which required compulsory registration and, therefore, the same could not be exhibited and was inadmissible in evidence. The learned Trial judge considered the judgments of various High Courts cited to reiterate the proposition that the absence of registration of the document prevented the same being exhibited and it was, therefore, in-admissible in evidence. He, accordingly, held that an unregistered document can be used in evidence only to the extent to prove a collateral purpose and it was to be seen as to whether the present document was being used for collateral purpose for proving the terms of lease between the parties. Reliance was placed on the statement made by the appellant Kirpa Ram that the document was sought to be exhibited by him for proving the contents of the same including the lease. This could not be allowed as per the settled law as referred to in the judgments of various High Courts. The other aspect of the matter, it was considered was whether the document could be separated in two parts, first for immovable property and second for movable property. The document contained lease of the shop as well as the machinery, electricity meter and other fittings installed therein. Thus, it could not be separated in two parts one for movable property and the other for immovable property. Therefore, it was held that the document could not be used in evidence inasmuch as it was not a registered document.

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the impugned document related to movable property as well as to immovable property and it was merely a hiring document of a running business. The suit was filed on that basis. The nature of the respondent/tenant's possession and the purpose of alleged lease was only a collateral purpose and, therefore, the document could be looked into and the trial court has fallen in error by misinterpreting and by mis-applying the law as well as the judgments cited before the Court. Secondly, it is contended that the dominant intention of the parties for which the lease was executed was only a collateral purpose and the non- registration of the same was of no consequence. The part of the document relating to the hiring of movable property does not require compulsory registration and the same can be admitted in evidence as a whole.