KEWAL KRISHAN Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have heard the arguments. Counsel for the petitioner has raised several pleas in support of the petitioner's case. I, however, do not consider it necessary to go into those in view of my findings on the plea of lack of sanction / authority in the person signing and filing the complaint, as is required under Section 6 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. My attention has been drawn to the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, which read as under:

(2.) It is not disputed before me that the person signing and filing the complaint had not been authorised as required under Section 6 quoted above. Mr. Lal, on being asked as to how the prosecution could be sustained in the absence of compliance with the provisions of Section 6, pointed out that in fact, a criminal report has been filed to the effect that no case could be established for want of evidence, but notwithstanding that, the learned Magistrate had proceeded to take cognizance of the offence.

(3.) In my opinion, no cognizance could have been taken at the very threshhold since the alleged act, admittedly even if proved, amounted to an offence, punishable under Section 5 of the said Act and cognizance thereof could have been taken only if a complaint had been brought before the Court in writing made by an officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by general or special order. No such writing has been pointed out. If such mandatory requirements are provided in the Act, it is incumbent on the Trial Court to satisfy itself as to whether the said requirement has been complied with before taking cognizance of the offence. In the light of the above discussion, I hold that the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. The accused are discharged. This petition and application stand disposed of in the above terms.