PARMOD KUMAR RASTOGI Vs. GIAN CHAND JAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the concurrent decisions of the Additional Rent Controller as well as of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing the objection of the petitioner against execution of the eviction order. The basic facts are that the respondent purchased the property in suit vide a sale deed duly registered on 12.8.1970. The sale deed showed that the father of the respondent, namely. Ram Sarup Jain was already a tenant in the property. The petitioner herein was inducted" in the year 1976. An eviction petition was filed on 28th April, 1988 by the respondent herein against Smt. Lila Devi, the mother of the respondent who, according to the respondent, had succeeded to the tenancy rights of his deceased father Ram Sarup Jain and the petitioner herein on the allegation that respondent No. I had without consent in writing of the landlord sublet, assigned or parted with possession of a portion of the tenanted premises as shown red in the site plan filed alongwith the eviction petition in favour of respondent No. 2. Thus/eviction was sought on the ground of sub-letting. Written statement was filed by respondent No. I supporting the case of the landlord in tl ie eviction petition. However, no written statement was filed by the respondent No. 2 who was alleged to be the unauthorised sub-tenant in the premises. On the other hand on the date of hearing fixed before the Additional Rent Controller, an application under Order 23, Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC was filed on 4th August, 1988 praying that the partics had arrived at a compromise. The respondents agreed to hand over peaceful vacant possession of the entire tenanted premises to the landlord on 31st March, 1990. A formal compromise agreement arrived at between the petitioner herein and the landlord was annexed to this application. It was prayed that a decree be passed in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties. The application is signed by the landlord as well as by the Advocate of respondent No. 1. There are no signatures on this application either of the petitioner herein or his Advocate. It may be mentioned here that the agreement by virtue of which the compromise was effected was annexed with the application for recording compromise and was filed in Court. It was duly signed bytile landlord as well as the petitioner herein and is also witnessed by a third party. The objector who is petitioner herein has not disputed the fact that the compromise agreement is signed by him. On the basis of application under Order 23, Rule 3 CPC and the agreement annexed thereto, the Addl. Rent Controller recorded a compromise on 4th August, 1988 and passed an eviction order against the respondents, i.e., the tenant as well as the sub-tenant. It was further ordered that the eviction order would be executable only after 31st March, 1990 if the tenants failed to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof in accordance with the compromise. The agreement was marked as Exhibit C-2. The order sheet of the Court recording this compromise and passing the eviction order is signed by all the three parties, i.e., the landlord as well as the tenant and the sub-tenant. The last date for handing over possession of the premises as per the said order was 31st March, 1990. On 28th March, 1990, the petitioner herein filed objections before the Additional Controller challenging the compromise aswell as the eviction order passed by the Addl. Rent Controller. After hearing Counsel for the parties on the objections, the Addl. Rent Controllerfinally dismissed the objections vide his judgment dated 19th November, 1990. It was held that it was a case in which it would be presumed that the Court had satisfied about the existence of the statutory ground for eviction before passing the eviction order in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Addl. Controller relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Courtin Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram lccharam @ Brijram and Others, AIR 1974 SC 471 and K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311. It was observed by the Additional Controller that there was "a clear admission in the agreement Exhibit C-2 about the existence of ground of subletting and this fact was specifically recorded by the Court in the order itself, and thus it will be presumed .that the Court was satisfied about the existence of said statutory ground and the decree passed in the case thus, cannot be said to be a nullity." The Addl. Controller further considered the argument on behalf of the objector that the compromise application was not signed by the objector. On this basis, it was submitted before the Controller that the requirement of Order 23, Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code was not satisfied and, therefore, the alleged compromise could not be given effect to. On this a spect. the Addl. Controller observed that it was sufficient that the objector had signed Exhibit C-2 which was the basis of the compromise application and the agrement itself was filed in Court alongwith the application under Order 23, Rule 3 CPC. Thus, the objections were dismissed on 19th November, 1990 by the Addl. Controller. The objector filed an appeal against the judgment of the Addl. Controller before the Rent Control Tribunal. The appeal met the same fate and was dismissed by the Tribunal vide its judgment dated 17th January, 1991. The present petition is directed against these decisions of the authorities below.

(2.) The learned Counsel for the objector vehemently urged that this was a case of total lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Additional Controller in dealing with the matter. He contended that the alleged tenant was none else than father of the landlord and after the death of the father, the mother of the landlord. On this basis, the contention is that the alleged sub-tenancy was a camouflage. Really, the objector was a tenant in the premises and fraud had been played on the Controller in obtaining an order of eviction on the basis of an alleged sub-letting. Secondly, it is submitted that the Controller could not record satisfaction on the basis of facts on record that the objector was a sub-tenant in the premises. The third submission is that there was no lawful compromise and the alleged compromise in the present case does not satisfy the requirements of Order 23, Rule 3 CPC.

(3.) So far as the contention on behalf of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the eviction petition and for that reason the eviction order is a nullity, the same is without any merit. The objector was neither claiming himself to be the owner of the premises nor it is a case of the objector being a trespasser. At the highest, the case of the objector could be that he was a tenant in the premises and the alleged sub-tenancy was a camouflage. The moment the Controller is called upon to consider whether a party is a tenant or a sub-tenant, no question of inherent lack of jurisdiction can be raised nor it can be said to be a case of fraud to confer jurisdiction on the Controller. Therefore, reliance by the learned Counsel for the objector on Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Brothers, (1992) 46 DLT 194 is totally misplaced.