SUGAR MILLS Vs. STATE TRADING CORPORATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) J.,-

(2.) THE scope and powers of the Courts to interfere with the conclusions of the Arbitrators in non-speaking awards, have been clearly demarcated and defined by authoritative pronouncements of the various High Courts and the Supreme Court. THEre is no use to state the well settled principle of law laid down in this behalf, except to keep in mind that prima facie in view of the non-speaking nature of the award the Court is not required to go into the findings of fact. THE arbitrator having decided the disputes between the parties in a manner which appeared to him most just and reasonable, will not entitle the Court to speculete, where no reasons are given, as to what impelled him to arrive at a particular conclusion. It is presumed that the Arbitrator arrived at his conclusion by a certain process of reasoning. It is also well settled that it is not open to the Court to attempt to probe the mental process by which the Arbitrator has reached his conclusion, where it is not disclosed by the terms of the award. THE Court cannot re-examine and reappraise the evidence and to sit in appeal over the conclusion of the Arbitrator in proceedings to set aside the award. THE mere dissent by a Court from Arbitrator's conclusion is not enough to set aside the award unless it can be shown by anything appearing from the face of the award that the Arbitrator has tred himself down to some legal proposition which is unsound. This setties the controversy that as a rule, the findings of the Arbitrator in a non-speaking award must be held to have become final, conclusive and binding on the parties. What about the speaking/reasoned awards. In this behalf also the endeavours of the Courts from the very beginning have been to approach an award with a desire to support it if that is reasonably possible, rather than to destroy it by calling it illegal. Under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act the Court exercises a limited jurisdiction. When the arbitrator give reasons for his award this does not open the doors to the Court to see what the contention of the party was and what was the evidence given by the parties on it and then examine the evidence to see whether the disputed findings of fact are sufficiently supported by the evidence or not. THE theory propounded that the Court can see the reasonableness of the reasons, if accepted, "would act at the root of the whole purpose of Arbitration, the basic idea of which is that the Arbitrator's decision shall be final." It has also been repeatedly emphasized by the Courts that the Arbitrator as a sole Tribunal is entitled to decide rightly or wrongly. It is not a misconduct on the part of the Arbitrator to come to an erroneous decision whether his error is one of fact or law and whether or not his finding of fact are supported by evidence. Under no circumstances the award of the Arbitrator can be challenged or opposed on the short ground that there was no sufficient evidence or that it was too tenacious or the like. From the Arbitrator what is wanted is "a practical decision on the disputed issues" and nothing more or less. Once the Arbitrator indicates his reasons for coming to a conclusion, the Court is not permitted to re-appraise the evidence sitting as a Court of appeal over the arbitrator's award. THE Courts have gone to the extent of holding that it is not misconduct on the part of the Arbitrator to go wrong in law so long as the mistake of law does not appear on the face of the award. With this background let us analyse the facts of the present case, with a view to decide the objections of the State Trading Corporation. Sh. V. Bhargava (retired Judge of the Supreme Court) was appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes of 150 sugar mills. THE Learned Arbitrator after hearing the parties at length made and published his award on 10-6-1981. It was a non-speaking award. THE State Trading Corporation (for short, ' THE STC') filed a petition for setting aside the said award on almost all conceivable grounds. THE matter came up before D.R. Khanna, J. By his detailed order dated 30th of July, 1982 the objections were accepted, but instead of setting uside the award, it was remitted to the learned Arbitrator for re-consideration on certain aspects only. Against this very order refusing to set aside the award, the STC filed special leave petition in the Supreme Court which was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn. THE relevant portion of the order of Khanna, J. remitting the award for re consideration is contained in paragraph 64 of the Judgment. It reads as under:

(3.) ON the contrary the conduct of the STC all alone have been to treat the sugar as their property. The following documents will throw light on this aspect. The consideration of these letters will also indicate that the learned Arbitrator not only perused, considered their scope, but also draw a right conclusion.