(1.) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned additional Sessions Judge by which he accepted the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Magistrate and acquitted the respondents.
(2.) THE prosecution case was that the Food Inspector on 31st July, 1973 purchased a sample of Dal Chana from the respondent Prakash Chand at Industrial Area, the said sample was found to be adulterated in as much as it was found that it contained 15.7 per cent of Kesri Dal and was insect infested.
(3.) IN appeal the main ground on which the respondent has been acquitted is that at the time of preparation of the inventory Ex.P.C. the respondent had written that Dal Chana is meant for manufacturing and preparing Churi for cattle and not for human consumption and the same is consumed as animal feed P.W.2 the Food Inspector in his evidence admitted that the accused Prakash Chand has written on Ex. P C. that Dal Chana is meant for cattle and not for human consumption. He also admitted that churi is used as cattle feed. He also admitted that he never saw accused Rakesh on the spot. It is quite clear taht teh prosecution case taht Ramesh Kumar was the Managing Director of the firm has nothing to support it apart from the bare ipse dexit of the Food inspector. No document showing that Ramesh was the Managing Director of the firm has been produced on record. Ramesh's acquittal, therefore can't be interfered with. Though no doubt taking of sample of Dal Chana was a sale within the meaning of the Act. But the important question, however, was as to whether this was kept for human consumption. Mr. Narula sought to urge that when the sale takes place within the meaning of the Act, it must be presumed that the same was for human consumption, and that the onus is on the respondent to show that it is otherwise. In the present case, what is admitted is that at the very time the sample was lifted Parkash Chand, respondent stated that this churi was meant for cattle and not for human consumption. The prosecution did not pursue this aspect any further and investigate whether this endorsement was correct or not. It should be noted that the prosecution case is that the respondents sold Chana as well as Besan. But it is common case that no besan was purchased form the firm nor there is any evidence to show that besan was sold by the respondents to anyone else. Had besan been lifted as a sample or sold to any one a duty might have been cast on the respondents to show that Dal Chana was kept only for cattle consumption and not for human consumption, and it might have failed because lifting of sample of besan which is only for human consumption would have negatived such a plea. This is because, it is well settled that in order to be "food" for human consumption, it need not be described of exhibited as intended for human consumption, it may even be otherwise described or exhibited, it need not even be necessarily intended for human consumption, it is enough it is generally of commonly used for human consumption or in the preparation of human food. But still a person is not without remedy for it has been said that a person selling an adulterated sample to the Food Inspector can invariably inform him that it was not for human consumption and thereby ensure himself against prosecution for selling adulterated food. Even though, therefore, a sale for analysis is a sale under the Act. the question still remain whether the respondents were selling for human consumption. The respondents took an immediate defence adn pleaded that it was not for human consumption. The appellate court on consideration of the evidence has acceped this plea sitting in aquittal we see no compelling reason as would persuade us to take a different view because we cannot find that the view taken by the appellate court is so perverse as to call for interference. The offence was committed in 1975 and we see no such compelling reason to persuade us to hold otherwise. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.