LAWS(DLH)-1985-7-4

PREM SEHGAL Vs. DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION

Decided On July 19, 1985
PREM SEHGAL Appellant
V/S
DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) According to petitioners charges contemplated against respondent No. 4 and communicated to him and further charges which were still to be communicated after investigation were all such as would amount to breach of the code of conduct by respondent No. 4 and, therefore, invited disciplinary action. It was for this reason that the Managing Committee took action u/s 8(4) read with Rule 115. In as much as prior approval of the Director was necessary to enforce suspension, this approval was sought by the communication dated 3.9.84. The approval was declined, as noticed earlier, by the Director's communication dated 11.9.84 In what circumstances and by what process such approval could be withheld or declined is the moot question.

(2.) As we read the Act and the relevant Rules, we are of the opinion that in case of unaided schools, the principles of internal management being by and large unfetterd has to be observed. There is no doubt that there exists a regulatory power but it can be exercised by Director of Education only on cogent and rational grounds. Unless the action of the Managing Committee is malafide or absolutely arbitrary, the director can not withhold approval. The approval was sought on the basis of charges already preferred after the explanation of respondent No. 4 had been received by the Managing Committee and to formulate further inquiry in the alleged misconduct and subject to further inquiry. A private unaided school is an autonomous body and so long as it acts as required by the provisions of the Act and the Rules, its autonomy cannot be interfered with. The employer is the Managing Committee and not the Director of Education. To permit the Director to interfere except in cases of arbitrariness or where mala fidies are spelt out would amount to undue interference with the powers of management. No autonomous body or indeed any body can function effectively if the management is made impotent. We find support for this principle in Shyam Lal v. Smt. Kusum Dhawan AIR 1970 SC. 1247.

(3.) There is no allegation of mala fides against any member of the Managing Committee in the present case. The resolution to suspend respondent No. 4 was passed unanimously by the Managing Committee when three members of the Directorate of Education were present and who participated in the proceedings of the Managing Committee. It is indeed strange that Mrs. Ahluwalia acting as a member of the Managing Committee did not oppose suspension of respondent No. 4 but while sitting in the Directorate gave a different opinion. The Directorate is not entitled to examine the charges proposed to be preferred or preferred against an employee as if sitting in appeal and deciding as such. This is precisely what seems to have been done as we find from the notings in the departmental file. Such examination of a case is impermissible. If a prima facie case is made out, the Directorate has to grant approval. We do not see how the allegations against respondent no. 4 turned out during the inquiry. A perusal of the file of the Directorate of Education very fairly placed before us makes very interesting reading.