PARTAP SINGH BHATIA Vs. KARTAR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the plaintiff and is directed against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court dated 8th January, 1969, by which the court has allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-objections and modifying the decree of the court of first instance dated 30th July, 1966, finally dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.

(2.) The dispute between the parties relates to allotment of property bear- ing No. XVI/5404, Arya Samaj Road, New Delhi, the ground floor of which was originally in possession of the defendant respondent, while the first floor was in possession of the plaintiff appellant. The respondent's father owned another property adjoining the one in dispute in which the appellant's father was a tenant. The appellant has alleged that on or about 22nd January, 1957, an arrangement had been arrived at between the appellant and the respondent to the effect that the property in dispute be allotted to the appellant and the respondent had taken some consideration for the same. The occasion for the arrangement was that the value of the property in dispute was about Rs. 9,381 and the verified claim held by the respondent was higher than the claim held by the appellant and so under statutory rules framed under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, the respondent had a preferential right to obtain conveyance of the property which was evacuee property. On 5th October, 1956 the Additional Regional Settlement Commissioner made a recommendation that the property in dispute may be transferred to the appellant. Eventually, on 21st February, 1957, th9 Chief Settlement Commissioner (by Ex. Public Witness-10/5) accepted the recommendation at the Additional Regional Settlement Commissioner and relied upon the alleged compromise between fhe appellant and the respondent (Ex. Public Witness-6/1 and Ex. Public Witness- 6/12). The property was consequently agreed to be transferred to the appellant and on 4th June, 1957 an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the Rehabilitation Authorities. This resulted in issuance of a notice of allotment to the respondent who maintains that till then he knew nothing about the proposed transfer of the property in dispute to the appellant. Faced with this situation, the respondent on 7th September, 1957 applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner (vide Ex. Public Witness-10/12) to recall his previous order. Notice of the application was issued to the appellant and eventually after hearing the parties the Chief Settlement Commissioner by order dated 2nd January, 1958 (Ex. Public Witness-10/16) recalled his previous order and cancelled the allotment of the property in dispute to the appellant and ordered its transfer to the respondent. He, however, imposed a condition that his order was subject to the determination by a civil court with regard to genuineness of the documents of compromise relied upon by the appellant. A revision against the said order preferred by the appellant before the Central Government under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 failed and was dismissed by order dated 25th March. 1958. Under the circumstances, the appellant instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal on 3rd April, 1958. In the plaint, the appellant before me recited the material facts mentioned above and relied upon the documents of compromise (Ex. Public Witness-6/1 and Ex. Public Witness-6/12) and claimed relief consequent upon the said declaration. He also claimed that the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner recalling his previous order was void and without jurisdiction and so was the order of the Central Government refusing to interfere. The public authorities did not contest the suit and the main contest was led on behalf of the respondent before me.

(3.) At this stage, it may be mentioned that there was one other person by name Kartar Singh, who was in occupation of part of the property in dispute. He was son of Jeevan Singh and is alleged to have surrendered his portion to the appellant. I am mentioning this fact to avoid his confusion with the respondent. whose name is .also Kartar Singh, but whose father's name is Sher Singh. Kartar Singh s/o Jeevan Singh is not at all material for the purposes of the present appeal and no reference would be made to him in this judgment